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In	  this	  paper	  I	  look	  at	  the	  evolving	  role	  of	  Russia	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  analyzing	  
transfers	  of	  Russian	  military	  equipment	  to	  its	  main	  ally	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  Syrian	  
Arab	  Republic.	  	  By	  using	  Syria	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  I	  provide	  insight	  as	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  
Russia’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  policy,	  examine	  the	  motivations	  that	  play	  a	  role	  in	  Moscow’s	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  the	  discuss	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  military	  landscape.	  	  My	  research	  illustrates	  that	  Russia	  is	  a	  prestige	  
seeking	  state	  that	  is	  motivated	  my	  domestic	  issues.	  	  Furthermore,	  sixty	  years	  of	  
arms	  transfers	  indicate	  that	  Russia	  has	  never	  sold	  game-­‐changing	  weapons	  to	  Syria	  
as	  this	  would	  be	  counterproductive	  to	  Moscow’s	  main	  goal	  in	  the	  region:	  the	  
brokering	  of	  a	  new	  Middle	  East	  peace	  deal.	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In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  evolving	  role	  of	  Russia1	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  
analyzing	  transfers	  of	  Russian	  military	  equipment	  to	  its	  main	  ally	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  
Syrian	  Arab	  Republic.	  	  By	  using	  Syria	  as	  a	  case	  study	  in	  the	  region,	  I	  will	  provide	  
insight	  as	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  Russia’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  policy	  and	  examine	  the	  
motivations	  that	  play	  a	  role	  in	  Moscow’s	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  theorists	  focusing	  on	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  USSR	  after	  World	  
War	  II,	  saw	  the	  Soviet	  policies	  as	  primarily	  driven	  by	  ideological	  differences	  with	  
West.	  	  This	  difference	  was	  quite	  pronounced	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  Soviet	  foreign	  
policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  with	  Moscow’s	  support	  for	  the	  socialist	  and	  communist	  
parties	  that	  were	  sprouting	  up	  in	  various	  Middle	  Eastern	  countries,	  such	  as	  Iraq	  and	  
Syria.	  	  Thus	  when	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  collapsed	  in	  1991,	  Moscow’s	  role	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East	  was	  thought	  to	  have	  been	  exhausted.	  	  Faced	  by	  a	  new	  system	  of	  government,	  
Moscow	  was	  further	  crippled	  by	  the	  economic	  crisis	  of	  1998,	  with	  the	  crash	  of	  the	  
rubel,	  and	  so	  was	  clearly	  unable	  to	  keep	  its	  own	  house	  in	  order,	  thus	  the	  idea	  of	  
influence	  abroad	  was	  farfetched.	  	  However	  with	  the	  election	  of	  Putin	  in	  2000,	  
Russian	  foreign	  policy	  began	  to	  shift	  and	  take	  form.	  	  	  
Russia	  is	  in	  fact	  still	  an	  important	  player	  in	  world	  politics	  and	  transatlantic	  
security,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  United	  States	  interests	  in	  the	  international	  
arena.	  Due	  to	  the	  large	  natural	  gas	  reserves	  located	  in	  Russia	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
                                                
1 Due	  to	  the	  time	  span	  covered	  by	  this	  thesis,	  1950-­‐2010,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  Moscow	  as	  synonymous	  
to	  both	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  Russian	  government.   
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supplies	  30%	  on	  Europe’s	  energy	  needs,	  Russia	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  
European	  economy2.	  	  Russia’s	  geographic	  position	  also	  lends	  it	  to	  be	  an	  ally	  for	  the	  
Americans	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  2001	  war	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  In	  2009,	  Russia	  granted	  the	  
US	  fly	  over	  rights	  for	  fighter	  jets	  heading	  to	  Afghanistan,	  but	  has	  no	  been	  allowed	  to	  
get	  further	  involved	  in	  the	  area.3	  	  
Russia’s	  relationship	  with	  Iran	  is	  also	  an	  important	  issue	  for	  a	  number	  of	  
Western	  actors.	  	  While	  it	  has	  been	  rocky	  in	  the	  past,	  first	  due	  to	  Iran’s	  relationship	  
with	  America	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Shah	  and	  then	  due	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Communist	  
stance	  of	  the	  Khomeini	  regime	  following	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  of	  1979,	  Russia	  is	  
now	  one	  of	  Iran’s	  closest	  allies.	  	  This	  relationship	  has	  been	  recently	  hampered	  due	  
to	  President’s	  Medvedev’s	  veto	  of	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  S-­‐300	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missiles	  
(SAMs),	  yet	  Russia	  remains	  close	  with	  Iran	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  act	  as	  a	  mediator	  
between	  Iran	  and	  the	  West	  on	  Iran’s	  nuclear	  program.	  
Military	  arms	  sales	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  because	  not	  only	  is	  Russia	  now	  
the	  fifth	  largest	  arms	  supplier	  in	  the	  world4	  but	  it	  is	  also	  estimated	  that	  Russian	  
military	  sales	  will	  increase	  by	  12%	  in	  20105.	  	  Thus	  the	  Russian	  military	  
establishment	  is	  going	  to	  be	  a	  major	  player	  worldwide	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  see	  
how	  it	  is	  used	  by	  Moscow,	  paying	  particular	  attention	  not	  only	  to	  the	  quantities	  of	  
                                                
2	  Erler,	  Gernot	  and	  Myers,	  Joanne	  J.	  “European	  energy	  security	  and	  the	  role	  of	  Russia.”	  The	  Carnegie	  
Council.	  5	  February	  2007.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5416.html.	  [Last	  accessed	  on:	  25	  October	  
2010.]	  
3	  Sims,	  Dimitri	  K.	  “An	  Uncertain	  Reset.”	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  July	  17,	  2009.	  	  
4	  SIPRI,	  “The	  SIPRI	  Top	  100	  Arms	  Producing	  Companies,	  2008,”	  c2010.	  
5	  RIA	  Novosti,	  Moscow	  April	  21,	  2010. 
 3 
weapons	  sold	  but	  also	  to	  the	  types	  of	  weaponry	  that	  are	  being	  sold.	  In	  my	  analysis,	  I	  
will	  examine	  sales	  of	  large	  military	  technology,	  such	  as	  aircraft,	  naval	  technology	  
and	  missiles	  as	  a	  gauge	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  area.	  	  I	  chose	  to	  use	  transfers	  of	  large	  
military	  equipment	  as	  my	  independent	  variable	  because	  unlike	  small	  arms,	  such	  as	  
AK-­‐47s	  and	  other	  rifles,	  large	  military	  equipment	  is	  feasible	  to	  track.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  
policies	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  USSR	  supplied	  its	  allies,	  such	  as	  China,	  with	  small	  arms	  
manufacturing	  facilities	  as	  a	  way	  of	  propping	  up	  the	  regimes.	  	  Additionally	  there	  
were	  a	  number	  of	  factories	  built	  in	  the	  various	  Soviet	  republics,	  which	  has	  allowed	  
these	  nations	  to	  continue	  production	  of	  Soviet	  arms	  after	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  
USSR.	  	  This	  combined	  with	  the	  large	  weapons	  stockpiles	  left	  behind	  when	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  fell,	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  track	  the	  origin	  of	  small	  arms	  sales	  and	  distinguish	  
between	  ones	  manufactured	  and	  sold	  by	  the	  Russians	  and	  those	  manufactured	  and	  
sold	  by	  other	  actors.	  	  	  
Starting	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1950,	  the	  USSR	  began	  to	  sell	  weapons	  to	  the	  Syrian	  
Arab	  Republic	  as	  a	  way	  of	  securing	  it	  as	  an	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Despite	  some	  
analysts’	  dismissal	  of	  the	  role	  of	  Syria	  due	  to	  its	  stagnant	  economy	  and	  bloated	  
military	  forces,	  Syria	  is	  still	  an	  important	  player	  in	  Middle	  Eastern	  politics,	  
particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  peace	  process.	  	  Syria	  has	  a	  number	  
of	  times	  acted	  as	  a	  “spoiler”6	  in	  the	  negotiations	  between	  the	  Israelis	  and	  the	  
Palestinians,	  but	  has	  also	  started	  independent	  negotiations	  with	  Israel	  in	  2008	  with	  
                                                
6 See	  Rubinstein,	  220;	  Sharp,	  Congressional	  Research	  service,	  April,	  26,	  2010.  
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the	  aim	  of	  regaining	  the	  Golan	  Heights,	  an	  important	  strategic	  military	  area	  and	  also	  
a	  abundant	  source	  of	  water7.	  	  These	  negotiations	  stalled	  following	  Israel’s	  armed	  
offensive	  in	  the	  Gaza	  strip	  in	  2009,	  but	  were	  significant	  as	  this	  was	  the	  first	  time	  
since	  2000	  that	  both	  parties	  met	  to	  discuss	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  peace	  treaty.	  	  With	  
the	  restart	  of	  the	  peace	  talks	  between	  the	  Israelis	  and	  the	  Palestinians	  earlier	  in	  
2010,	  the	  American	  government	  has	  acknowledged	  the	  pivotal	  role	  the	  Syrian	  
government	  plays	  in	  Middle	  Eastern	  negotiations	  and	  secretary	  Clinton	  has	  
encouraged	  the	  restart	  of	  the	  negotiations	  between	  Israel	  and	  Syria	  as	  a	  major	  help	  
to	  the	  negotiations	  between	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  the	  Israelis.	  	  	  
Additionally	  the	  Syrian	  government	  is	  also	  a	  significant	  player	  in	  Lebanese	  
politics	  due	  to	  the	  historical	  role	  of	  the	  Syria	  government	  played	  in	  Lebanon	  after	  
the	  bombing	  of	  the	  American	  embassy	  in	  Beirut	  in	  1983.	  	  While	  Syrian	  troops	  
withdrew	  from	  Lebanon	  after	  the	  assassination	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Rafik	  Hariri	  in	  
2005,	  Syria	  continued	  to	  have	  dealings	  with	  the	  militia	  group	  turned	  political	  party:	  
Hezbollah.	  	  	  
	   The	  primary	  concern	  of	  this	  work	  is	  to	  look	  at	  Russian	  military	  hardware	  
sales	  as	  an	  assessment	  of	  Russian	  influence	  and	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  	  I	  focus	  
on	  these	  sales	  because	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  successor	  state	  Russia,	  have	  
used	  arms	  sales	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  foreign	  policy8.	  	  Some	  scholars	  would	  dispute	  
                                                
7	  “Regions	  and	  territories:	  The	  Golan	  Heights.”	  BBC	  News.	  Available	  at:	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/3393813.stm.	  [Last	  accessed:	  25	  October	  
2010.]	  
8	  Efrat,	  1991;	  Taylor,	  1980;	  Roberts,	  1983. 
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that	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case	  in	  contemporary	  Russia	  due	  to	  the	  privatization	  of	  
weapons	  companies	  after	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  However,	  if	  one	  
would	  look	  closely	  at	  the	  ownership	  of	  Russian	  arms	  exporters	  they	  would	  see	  that	  
Russian	  companies	  are	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  government	  either	  through	  overt	  
stock	  ownership	  or	  through	  more	  obscure	  personal	  relationships9.	  
I	  will	  also	  discuss	  the	  motivations	  behind	  these	  transaction	  between	  Moscow	  
and	  Damascus	  and	  what	  insight	  this	  analysis	  can	  give	  on	  Russian	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
Another	  aspect	  of	  the	  study	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  these	  sales,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  power	  
balance	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  what	  predictions	  can	  be	  made	  about	  the	  future	  of	  
Russian	  policy	  and	  behavior	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Middle	  East.	  
I	  seek	  to	  address	  these	  issues	  in	  three	  sections.	  	  Firstly,	  I	  examine	  the	  
literature	  dealing	  with	  Soviet	  and	  Syrian	  military	  cooperation	  between	  the	  years	  of	  
1950	  and	  2010.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  works	  written	  about	  this	  period	  focus	  largely	  on	  the	  
anti-­‐Western	  ideology	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  look	  at	  how	  the	  Cold	  War	  conflict	  played	  out	  
between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  
policy	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  at	  the	  time,	  to	  use	  military	  sales	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  
foreign	  policy,	  has	  survived	  the	  USSR.	  	  While	  Moscow	  has	  started	  to	  implement	  
other	  methods	  to	  exert	  influence,	  it	  still	  remains	  a	  card	  that	  is	  used	  and	  can	  give	  
insight	  into	  Moscow’s	  true	  international	  ambitions.	  
                                                
9	  Simes,	  Dimitri	  K.	  and	  Saunders,	  Paul	  J.	  “The	  Kremlin	  Begs	  to	  Differ.”	  The	  National	  Insterest.	  Nov-­‐Dec	  
2009.	  Can	  be	  accessed	  at	  http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-­‐kremlin-­‐begs-­‐to-­‐differ-­‐3280	  ;	  last	  
accessed	  10/21/10.	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Secondly,	  I	  examine	  the	  literature	  dealing	  with	  Russian	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
Looking	  at	  the	  importance	  of	  domestic	  issues,	  particularly	  prestige,	  for	  Moscow,	  in	  
both	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Russian	  period,	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  reasons	  that	  the	  Russian	  
government	  has	  continued	  to	  have	  dealings	  with	  Syria,	  while	  it	  has	  cut	  out	  other	  
strategic	  regional	  partners,	  such	  as	  Iran.	  	  	  
Then	  I	  proceed	  to	  give	  a	  background	  on	  Russian	  and	  Syrian	  non-­‐military	  
relations	  and	  the	  circumstances	  that	  have	  led	  the	  two	  countries	  to	  develop	  military	  
cooperation.	  	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  arms	  trade	  between	  Syria	  and	  
Russia	  over	  the	  period	  of	  1950	  to	  2010.	  	  As	  a	  comparison	  of	  Moscow’s	  interest	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East,	  I	  look	  at	  arms	  transactions	  between	  Egypt	  and	  the	  USSR.	  	  The	  
Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute	  (SIPRI)	  database	  allows	  me	  to	  
examine	  the	  types	  and	  amounts	  of	  transfers	  for	  most	  of	  the	  time	  period	  covered	  by	  
this	  paper.	  	  The	  last	  year	  of	  the	  study,	  2010,	  is	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  SIPRI	  database	  
and	  so	  I	  rely	  on	  several	  Western	  News	  agencies	  to	  supplement	  my	  findings.	  	  I	  then	  
test	  the	  hypothesis	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  summarize	  my	  findings	  and	  







Chapter	  1:	  Literature	  Review	  and	  Hypothesis	  
Most	  of	  the	  literature	  dealing	  with	  Moscow’s	  role	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  relies	  
heavily	  on	  the	  anti-­‐Western	  ideology	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War.	  	  In	  the	  specific	  discussion	  about	  the	  sales	  of	  weapons,	  a	  number	  of	  authors,	  
such	  as	  Taylor,	  Mott,	  Glassman	  and	  Roberts	  treat	  weapon	  sales	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
as	  an	  extension	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Roberts	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  types	  of	  weaponry	  
sold	  concentrating	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  Moscow	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  selling	  modern	  
weapon	  to	  the	  Syrian	  government	  but	  was	  forced	  to	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  its	  
credibility	  as	  an	  arms	  supplier.	  	  Roberts	  argues	  that	  the	  USSR	  supplied	  more	  
modern	  and	  more	  accurate	  weaponry	  to	  the	  Syrian	  government	  in	  order	  to	  
compensate	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  proper	  training.	  	  In	  order	  to	  emphasize	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
was	  poor	  training	  as	  opposed	  to	  faulty	  equipment,	  which	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  
poor	  showing	  of	  the	  Syrian	  troops	  in	  the	  Yom	  Kippur	  War,	  Moscow	  insisted	  on	  
manning	  the	  SA-­‐5	  air-­‐defense	  (AD)	  system	  with	  their	  own	  troops	  until	  1985,	  three	  
years	  after	  the	  original	  sale10.	  	  Roberts	  concludes	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  really	  
achieve	  any	  significant	  policy	  goals	  as	  of	  1983,	  and	  speculates	  that	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  
the	  USSR	  will	  succeed	  in	  winning	  friends	  and	  influencing	  people	  with	  military	  sales.	  	  
Instead	  of	  being	  able	  to	  use	  the	  weapon	  sales	  as	  a	  lever	  of	  influence	  against	  Syria,	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  became	  a	  victim	  of	  its	  own	  game.	  	  Hafez	  al-­‐Assad	  knew	  that	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  lose	  Syria	  as	  an	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  so	  he	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was	  able	  to	  use	  the	  USSR’s	  ideological	  crutch	  as	  a	  way	  of	  exerting	  reverse	  influence	  
against	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  
Like	  Glassman	  and	  Roberts,	  Kreutz	  argues	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  forced	  
to	  support	  Syria	  with	  military	  sales	  during	  the	  1980s	  if	  it	  was	  going	  to	  maintain	  
relevance	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  despite	  Damascus’	  lack	  of	  desire	  to	  cooperate	  with	  
Moscow	  on	  certain	  policy	  concerns.	  	  During	  the	  1990s,	  Syrian-­‐Russian	  relations	  hit	  a	  
low	  point	  and	  Syria	  began	  looking	  for	  new	  allies	  to	  replace	  the	  USSR/Russia	  as	  the	  
main	  arms	  supplier,	  and	  refusing	  to	  repay	  old	  debts	  for	  arms	  sales	  to	  Moscow,	  
however	  these	  efforts	  did	  not	  bare	  fruit	  seeing	  as	  Syria’s	  military	  is	  90%	  Soviet	  
stock	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  equipment	  from	  new	  supplier	  would	  cause	  a	  
compatibility	  issue.	  	  Much	  like	  Bourtman,	  Kreutz	  discusses	  Israel’s	  growing	  
influence	  in	  the	  Kremlin	  and	  that	  in	  recent	  years	  with	  Moscow	  reporting	  that	  it	  
“only	  intends	  to	  sell	  Syria	  defensive	  weapons	  and	  spare	  parts	  to	  weapon	  systems	  
that	  were	  supplied	  to	  Syria	  by	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union”11.	  	  In	  looking	  at	  the	  
determinants	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  and	  its	  military	  sales	  to	  Syria,	  Kreutz,	  argues	  
that	  Moscow	  has	  rekindled	  its	  links	  with	  Damascus	  as	  a	  way	  of	  “reentering	  the	  
Middle	  Eastern	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  arena	  and	  laying	  a	  genuine	  role	  in	  the	  Arab-­‐
Israeli	  Process”12.	  	  The	  same	  sentiment	  is	  present	  in	  Anatoliy	  Tsuganok’s	  article,	  
published	  in	  2006,	  a	  year	  prior	  to	  Kreutz’s	  book,	  stating	  that	  “in	  the	  opinion	  of	  many	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experts,	  Syria	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  restarting	  the	  dialogue	  with	  Israel,	  which	  has	  
been	  at	  a	  standstill	  for	  many	  years.13”	  	  
Another	  focus	  of	  Soviet	  defense	  policy	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  literature	  was	  the	  
issue	  of	  geographical	  security.	  	  In	  his	  article	  “Soviet	  Strategic	  Interests	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East,”	  Alvin	  Rubinstein	  argues	  that	  the	  most	  important	  need	  that	  drives	  Soviet	  
policy	  makers	  is	  the	  need	  to	  secure	  the	  borders	  to	  the	  south,	  which	  includes	  keeping	  
friendly	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  regimes	  in	  power.	  	  Like	  Goodman,	  he	  stresses	  the	  
USSR’s	  need	  for	  military	  privileges	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  region,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
American	  influence	  in	  the	  area.	  	  While	  he	  does	  mention	  Moscow’s	  desire	  to	  be	  part	  
of	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process,	  in	  his	  opinion	  the	  goal	  is	  counter-­‐productive,	  as	  he	  
does	  not	  see	  prestige	  and	  legitimization	  as	  something	  that	  the	  USSR	  should	  concern	  
itself	  with14.	  	  He	  feels	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  already	  doing	  a	  sufficient	  job	  and	  
the	  presence	  of	  another	  superpower	  would	  just	  hamper	  the	  process.	  
Goodman	  states	  that	  the	  USSR	  wanted	  “Syria	  to	  act	  as	  spoiler	  in	  the	  Arab-­‐
Israeli	  confrontation”	  to	  prevent	  a	  peace	  deal	  from	  coming	  though15.	  	  Thus	  the	  
author	  does	  not	  even	  entertain	  the	  idea	  that	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  
the	  region	  is	  to	  broker	  a	  peace	  deal	  and	  thus	  secure	  the	  prestige	  and	  legitimacy	  that	  
comes	  with	  it.	  	  According	  to	  Goodman,	  the	  driving	  factor	  behind	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  
decisions	  in	  the	  region	  was	  access	  to	  military	  facilities	  in	  the	  Mediterranean,	  the	  Red	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Sea	  and	  the	  Indian	  Ocean16.	  	  By	  providing	  Syria	  with	  military	  assistance,	  Moscow	  in	  
turn	  gained	  two	  ports	  on	  the	  Mediterranean,	  Latakia	  and	  Tartus,	  allowing	  them	  to	  
expand	  their	  sphere	  of	  influence	  and	  fulfill	  that	  ever	  pressing	  need	  for	  a	  warm	  water	  
port.	  
Moving	  into	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  period	  of	  Moscow’s	  Middle	  Easter	  relations,	  
there	  are	  few	  authors	  that	  deal	  with	  Russian	  relations	  with	  that	  region.	  	  In	  his	  
article,	  “Putin	  and	  Russia’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  Policy”	  published	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  
Review	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  Ilya	  Bourtman	  looks	  at	  the	  new	  direction	  of	  Russia’s	  
Middle	  Eastern	  policy,	  analyzing	  the	  role	  of	  Israel	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  Russian	  policy	  
in	  the	  region.	  	  According	  to	  him,	  Putin’s	  main	  initiative	  has	  been	  to	  maintain	  parallel	  
relations	  with	  both	  Israel	  and	  other	  Middle	  Eastern	  nations,	  such	  as	  Syria,	  the	  
Palestinian	  Authority	  and	  Iran.	  Bourtman	  argues	  that	  due	  to	  greater	  trade	  with	  
Israel,	  which	  amounts	  close	  to	  $1.5	  billion	  in	  direct	  trade	  and	  over	  a	  billion	  in	  
energy	  deals,	  Israel	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  using	  its	  economic	  influence	  to	  pressure	  
Moscow	  into	  canceling	  several	  arms	  deals	  to	  both	  Syria	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  
Authority.	  	  A	  particular	  success	  for	  the	  Israeli	  government	  occurred	  in	  2005	  when	  
they	  succeeded	  in	  convincing	  Russia	  to	  modify	  the	  200	  SA-­‐18	  Grouse	  portable	  SAMs,	  
so	  that	  they	  would	  be	  mounted	  on	  vehicles,	  helicopters	  and	  ships	  instead	  of	  portable	  
launchers.	  	  This	  modification	  makes	  the	  missiles	  easier	  to	  track	  and	  thus	  helped	  
assuage	  Israeli	  fears	  that	  they	  would	  be	  transferred	  to	  Hezbollah	  without	  their	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knowledge.	  	  However,	  Bourtman	  also	  states	  that	  Israel	  is	  increasingly	  depended	  on	  
Russia	  for	  its	  energy	  supplies	  and	  holds	  far	  fewer	  cards	  than	  Russia	  due	  to	  this	  
factor.	  	  Additionally,	  Bourtman	  is	  unable	  to	  explain	  Israel’s	  lack	  to	  success	  in	  
preventing	  Russia	  from	  dealing	  with	  Iran,	  who	  poses	  a	  bigger	  security	  threat	  than	  
Syria.	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  this	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Syrian	  lobby	  in	  the	  Kremlin,	  
which	  has	  survived	  since	  the	  days	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  Arabists	  like	  Yevgeny	  
Primakov17;	  however	  that	  still	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  Moscow	  continues	  to	  deal	  with	  
Iran	  (a	  non-­‐Arab	  state)	  on	  such	  warm	  terms.	  
Russia’s	  special	  relationship	  with	  Iran	  can	  be	  explained	  through	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  Muslims	  perceive	  Russia’s	  stance	  toward	  Islamic	  peoples,	  particularly	  when	  
viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  Russia’s	  Chechnya	  problem.	  	  Recently	  no	  party	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  has	  spoken	  out	  against	  Russia’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  Chechnya	  province,	  but	  
there	  has	  been	  a	  history	  of	  tensions	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  their	  dealings	  with	  Iran.	  	  As	  
part	  of	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini’s	  pan-­‐Islamic	  policy,	  the	  Ayatollah	  called	  for	  the	  
liberation	  of	  the	  Muslim	  populations	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  beneath	  the	  thumb	  of	  
the	  atheist	  government.	  	  While	  that	  rhetoric	  has	  disappeared	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  
Moscow	  realizes	  that	  they	  need	  to	  keep	  Russia’s	  image	  positive	  in	  that	  area	  of	  the	  
world	  so	  that	  public	  opinion	  remains	  in	  favor	  of	  Russia.	  	  
In	  the	  literature	  focusing	  on	  the	  determinants	  of	  Moscow’s	  Middle	  Eastern	  
policy,	  the	  bulk	  of	  it	  talks	  about	  the	  role	  of	  anti-­‐Western	  ideology.	  	  This	  emphasis	  on	  
                                                
17	  Yevgeny	  Primakov	  is	  a	  Russian	  politician	  and	  diplomat.	  	  Before	  he	  started	  his	  political	  career,	  He	  
served	  as	  Middle	  East	  correspondent	  first	  for	  the	  State	  Committee	  for	  Television	  and	  Radio	  (1956-­‐
1960)	  and	  then	  for	  Pravda	  (1960-­‐1970).	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ideology	  was	  primarily	  the	  staple	  of	  literature	  written	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union.	  	  While	  this	  argument	  was	  rarely	  applied	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  after	  the	  
disintegration	  of	  the	  USSR,	  since	  that	  is	  usually	  viewed	  as	  the	  arena	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  
the	  argument	  of	  Russia’s	  anti-­‐Western	  ideology	  has	  resurfaced	  with	  regards	  to	  
Russian	  foreign	  policy	  after	  the	  election	  of	  Vladimir	  Putin	  in	  2000.	  	  Furthermore	  
when	  scholars	  discuss	  the	  presidency	  of	  Medvedev,	  in	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  Putin,	  they	  
frame	  it	  in	  a	  pro-­‐Western	  light.	  	  	  This	  point	  is	  emphasized	  in	  discussions	  of	  Russia’s	  
signing	  of	  sanctions	  against	  Iran,	  Medvedev’s	  veto	  of	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  S-­‐300	  missile	  
defense	  system	  to	  Tehran18,	  and	  the	  new	  $400	  million	  military	  deal	  with	  Israel	  to	  
develop	  drone	  technology	  in	  Russia.	  	  These	  moves	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  new	  
pro-­‐Western	  direction	  for	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  however,	  Russia	  still	  has	  continued	  
to	  work	  with	  Iran	  on	  the	  Bushehr	  nuclear	  facility	  and	  has	  gone	  ahead	  with	  the	  
Yakhot	  anti-­‐ship	  missile,	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  missiles	  in	  its	  class,	  despite	  
objections	  from	  the	  West.	  
	   Another	  argument	  that	  has	  been	  raised	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  Russian	  
military	  sales	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  Russian	  domestic	  economic	  and	  defense	  policies.	  	  
Looking	  at	  the	  economic	  aspect,	  the	  sale	  of	  military	  equipment	  both	  provides	  
revenue	  and	  allows	  Russia	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  dated	  equipment	  making	  room	  for	  new	  
technologies.	  	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  exports	  kept	  the	  Russian	  military	  
                                                
18	  “Iran	  protests	  Russian	  Missile	  Concellation.”	  United	  Press	  International	  (UPI).	  28	  September	  2010.	  
Available	  at:	  http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/09/28/Iran-­‐protests-­‐
Russian_missile-­‐cancellation/UPI-­‐53401285703715/.	  [Last	  accessed:	  25	  October	  2010]	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manufacturing	  establishment	  afloat	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  still	  remain	  a	  large	  
portion	  of	  what	  money	  gets	  spent	  on,	  as	  opposed	  to	  research	  and	  development19.	  	  
However	  the	  financial	  argument	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  2005	  
meeting	  between	  Bashar	  al-­‐Asad	  and	  President	  Putin	  in	  Moscow.	  	  While	  the	  two	  
countries	  did	  conclude	  a	  new	  military	  agreement,	  President	  Putin	  also	  forgave	  73%	  
of	  Syrian	  Cold	  War	  debts,	  amounting	  to	  roughly	  $58	  billion20.	  	  Furthermore,	  in	  
September	  2010,	  President	  Medvedev	  announced	  that	  he	  was	  vetoing	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  
S-­‐300	  missile	  defense	  system	  to	  Iran,	  citing	  UN	  Resolution	  192921	  the	  driving	  force	  
behind	  the	  decision.	  	  However	  not	  only	  did	  the	  veto	  cover	  the	  S-­‐300	  missiles,	  but	  it	  
also	  extended	  to	  all	  other	  military	  deals	  with	  Iran,	  which	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  
were	  no	  economic	  motivations	  as	  military	  trade	  with	  Iran	  amounts	  to	  about	  $11-­‐13	  
billion22.	  	  This	  veto	  has	  resulted	  with	  the	  Russians	  having	  to	  repay	  the	  $166.8	  
million	  that	  Iran	  has	  already	  paid	  for	  the	  missiles.	  	  	  
National	  defense	  has	  always	  been	  a	  paramount	  concern	  for	  Russia	  
throughout	  its	  history	  and	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  understand	  if	  one	  looks	  a	  map	  of	  
Russia.	  	  Russia	  is	  a	  huge	  country	  that	  covers	  eleven	  time	  zones	  with	  almost	  no	  
natural	  boundaries,	  except	  for	  the	  Arctic	  in	  the	  north.	  	  During	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
                                                
19	  Oliker,	  48.	  	  
20	  Commission	  on	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe.	  	  “The	  Russian-­‐Syrian	  Connection:	  thwarting	  
democracy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  greater	  OSCE	  region:	  hearing	  before	  the	  Commission	  on	  
Security	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe,”	  18.	  
21	  Resolution	  1929	  was	  passed	  on	  June	  9,	  2010	  by	  the	  UN	  General	  assembly	  calling	  for	  the	  ban	  of	  
sales	  of	  military	  hardware	  to	  Iran.	  	  	  
22	  Kucera,	  Joshua.	  “Russia’s	  cagey	  moves	  toward	  Iran	  and	  the	  US.”	  	  Sept.	  27,	  2010.	  
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62024.	  Last	  accessed	  on:	  Oct.	  23,	  2010.	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Union,	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  had	  a	  nice	  buffer	  zone	  consisting	  of	  Soviet	  Republics	  
if	  someone	  chose	  to	  invade,	  but	  even	  during	  the	  times	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  the	  issue	  
of	  the	  “soft	  underbelly”	  always	  weighed	  heavily	  on	  Moscow’s	  conscience23.	  	  Now,	  
not	  only	  have	  the	  former	  Soviet	  provinces	  gained	  independence,	  but	  also	  their	  
boarder	  security	  has	  not	  improved	  much	  with	  independence.	  	  This	  is	  further	  
complicated	  by	  Russia’s	  shrinking	  population	  and	  military	  reforms,	  which	  in	  turn	  
decreases	  the	  number	  of	  conscripted	  soldiers	  that	  are	  available	  to	  guard	  Russian	  
boarders24.	  	  Recently,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  push	  to	  both	  modernize	  the	  Russian	  army	  as	  
well	  as	  change	  it	  from	  a	  largely	  conscripted	  force	  to	  a	  professional	  officer	  corps.	  	  
This	  concern	  that	  Russia	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  Moscow’s	  new	  military	  cooperation	  with	  
Israel.	  	  Security	  concerns	  are	  exacerbated	  by	  Chechen	  demands	  for	  independence	  
and	  the	  armed	  conflict	  that	  has	  ensued	  due	  to	  Russia’s	  continued	  refusal	  to	  meet	  
their	  demands.	  
	   But	  the	  primary	  factor	  in	  the	  crafting	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  
prestige.	  	  This	  phenomenon	  was	  quite	  often	  tied	  to	  Moscow’s	  anti-­‐Western	  ideology	  
during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  This	  issue	  is	  visible	  in	  Cynthia	  Robert’s	  discussion	  of	  
Soviet	  pride	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  poor	  showing	  of	  Soviet	  weapons	  against	  US	  
technology	  during	  the	  Yom	  Kippur	  War	  between	  the	  Arab	  nations	  and	  Israel.	  	  
Rubinstein	  also	  mentions	  Moscow’s	  goals	  for	  prestige,	  however	  he	  dismisses	  them	  
                                                
23	  Glassman,	  1975.	  
24	  Oliker,	  et	  al.,	  148. 
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quickly	  placing	  emphasis	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  sufficient	  in	  order	  to	  
shepherd	  the	  Israelis	  and	  the	  Palestinians	  into	  a	  workable	  peace	  treaty.	  	  	  
	   Like	  ideology,	  the	  argument	  of	  prestige	  has	  resurface	  with	  the	  presidency	  of	  
Vladimir	  Putin.	  	  While	  this	  quest	  for	  prestige	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  abandoned	  by	  
President	  Medvedev,	  who	  wants	  to	  focus	  on	  restarting	  Russia’s	  internal	  economy	  
and	  national	  defense,	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  the	  case.	  	  The	  most	  important	  thing	  that	  
needs	  to	  be	  understood	  when	  dealing	  with	  Russian	  politics,	  is	  that	  foreign	  policy	  is	  
determined	  by	  domestic	  necessities25.	  	  This	  is	  necessary	  to	  look	  at	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  
Russian	  public	  and	  ascertain	  what	  the	  term	  prestige	  and	  Great	  Power	  mean	  to	  
them26.	  	  
In	  her	  article,	  “Naslediye	  imperii	  v	  obshestvennom	  soznaniyi	  Rossiyan,”	  
Tihonova	  deals	  with	  the	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  the	  Russian	  public	  and	  how	  much	  
importance	  the	  people	  ascribe	  to	  the	  term	  Great	  Power27.	  	  Through	  extensive	  
surveys	  conducted	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years	  she	  found	  that	  the	  Russian	  people	  do	  not	  
want	  to	  return	  to	  the	  bi-­‐polar	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  but	  instead	  favor	  a	  multi-­‐polar	  
system	  in	  which	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  players.	  	  Furthermore	  
her	  findings	  illustrate	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Russian	  people	  linked	  the	  idea	  of	  greatness	  in	  
                                                
25	  Oliker,	  et.	  al.,	  89.	  	  
26	  I	  use	  the	  term	  Great	  power	  as	  a	  translation	  for	  the	  Russian:	  Великая	  Держава	  (Velikaya	  
Derzhava)	  
27	  Tihonova’s	  article	  in	  translations	  titled:	  “The	  inheritance	  of	  the	  empire	  in	  the	  collective	  
conceptualization	  of	  the	  Russian	  people.”	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the	  international	  arena	  to	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  Russian	  citizens	  as	  well	  as	  
overall	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity28	  
However	  the	  issue	  of	  prestige	  is	  more	  complex	  in	  that	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  issues	  
that	  also	  has	  foreign	  determinants.	  	  It	  is	  not	  only	  sufficient	  for	  Russian	  citizens	  to	  
consider	  Moscow	  to	  be	  working	  in	  their	  interests	  but	  Russia’s	  prestige	  in	  the	  
international	  arena	  is	  also	  determined	  by	  outside	  actors,	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  
other	  nation	  states	  and	  their	  perceptions	  of	  Russia.	  	  	  
	   In	  Noymann’s	  article	  entitled,	  “Rossiyskoye	  stremleniye	  k	  velikoderzhaviyu:	  
kak	  Rossiya	  dobilas’	  priznaniya	  Evropu,”29	  he	  argues	  that	  neither	  economic	  
prosperity	  nor	  military	  supremacy	  is	  sufficient	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  designating	  of	  a	  
state	  as	  a	  Great	  Power.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  Russian	  history	  stating	  that	  despite	  
the	  fact	  that	  Russia	  had	  all	  the	  makings	  of	  a	  Great	  Power	  as	  early	  as	  the	  15th	  century	  
but	  it	  was	  not	  recognized	  as	  such	  until	  its	  victory	  over	  Sweden	  in	  172130.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  even	  after	  this	  point,	  the	  European	  powers	  had	  reservations	  about	  
Russia’s	  qualifications	  for	  Great	  Power	  status,	  due	  to	  its	  divergence	  from	  the	  
European	  model	  of	  government.	  	  He	  applies	  this	  argument	  to	  modern	  day	  Russia	  
and	  Putin’s	  position	  as	  stated	  in	  his	  2001	  New	  Year’s	  annual	  address.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  
say	  that	  in	  today’s	  contemporary	  inter-­‐connected	  world,	  military	  strength	  is	  no	  
                                                
28	  Tihonova,	  p.114. 
29	  Noymann’s	  title	  in	  translation:	  “Russian	  aspirations	  toward	  Great	  Power	  status:	  how	  Russia	  was	  
accepted	  by	  Europe.”	  
30	  	  Noymann	  p.176	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longer	  sufficient	  in	  order	  to	  garner	  respect	  of	  nations31.	  	  What	  is	  required	  to	  achieve	  
the	  recognition	  of	  peers	  as	  a	  Great	  Power	  is	  a	  similarity	  in	  styles	  of	  governance.	  
Overall	  the	  literature	  focuses	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Soviet,	  and	  then	  Russian,	  
policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  interacts	  with	  Israel	  and	  the	  United	  States	  regional	  
interests.	  	  Authors	  like	  Glassman,	  Mott	  and	  Roberts	  see	  Moscow’s	  policy	  to	  be	  
ideologically	  driven	  and	  Soviet	  support	  of	  Syria	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
Israel/anti-­‐West	  stance	  of	  the	  USSR.	  	  Bourtman’s	  article	  takes	  a	  slightly	  different	  
approach,	  stating	  that	  now	  that	  the	  ideological	  aspect	  of	  Moscow’s	  foreign	  policy	  is	  
gone,	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  area	  of	  interest	  to	  Russia.	  	  In	  the	  foreign	  policy	  
literature,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  domestic	  issues	  that	  drive	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  
importance	  of	  prestige	  for	  Russia.	  
	   I	  hypothesize	  that	  Russia	  is	  and	  always	  has	  been	  a	  prestige	  seeking	  state.	  	  I	  
argue	  that	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  this	  prestige-­‐seeking	  behavior	  was	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  ideological	  motivations	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  While	  the	  
purpose	  of	  government	  policies	  were	  meant	  to	  subvert	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  
States,	  they	  were	  also	  meant	  to	  promote	  Soviet	  interests	  and	  importance.	  	  I	  use	  this	  
prestige-­‐seeking	  behavior	  to	  explain	  the	  reasons,	  which	  motivated	  the	  sale	  of	  
military	  technology	  to	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  as	  a	  means	  of	  reassuring	  them	  that	  the	  USSR	  
was	  a	  strong	  and	  capable	  ally	  who	  would	  support	  that	  Arab	  governments	  in	  their	  
struggle	  against	  Israel	  and	  was	  very	  interested	  in	  resolving	  the	  Palestinian	  question.	  	  
                                                
31	  Noymann	  p.176 
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However	  the	  ideological	  bent	  of	  the	  Soviet	  policies	  proved	  to	  be	  counterproductive	  
by	  limiting	  the	  actors	  with	  whom	  the	  USSR	  could	  deal.	  
	   With	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Moscow	  has	  lost	  its	  Great	  Power	  status	  and	  is	  
now	  seeking	  to	  regain	  its	  standing	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  However	  it	  has	  
become	  obvious	  to	  Russia	  that	  military	  supremacy	  is	  no	  longer	  enough	  in	  order	  to	  
be	  considered	  a	  Great	  Power.	  	  Now	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  status,	  a	  country	  needs	  
to	  be	  a	  leader	  as	  part	  of	  international	  bodies	  that	  proposes	  and	  implements	  policy	  
and	  while	  Russia	  is	  part	  of	  both	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  G-­‐8,	  is	  has	  a	  
reputation	  for	  achieving	  its	  goals	  thorough	  veto	  power	  as	  opposed	  through	  
proposing	  legislation.	  	  Furthermore,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  Great	  Power	  there	  
needs	  to	  be	  some	  consideration	  given	  to	  international	  opinion	  since	  in	  no	  one	  
considers	  Russia	  a	  Great	  Power	  but	  Russia	  itself,	  that	  does	  not	  go	  far	  in	  achieving	  
Russia’s	  aims.	  	  And	  while	  Russia	  is	  now	  more	  open	  to	  Western	  opinions,	  it	  will	  only	  
agree	  to	  implement	  a	  policy	  that	  is	  in	  line	  with	  its	  domestic	  interests.	  	  To	  this	  day,	  
Russia	  uses	  military	  sales	  to	  foreign	  nations,	  such	  as	  Syria,	  to	  garner	  respect	  and	  
influence.	  
In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  test	  this	  hypothesis	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  types	  and	  







Chapter	  2:	  Evidence	  and	  Analysis	  	  
	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  give	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  
Syria	  and	  Egypt	  and	  move	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  military	  cooperation	  between	  the	  three	  
nations.	  	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  perspective	  on	  the	  Soviet	  interest	  in	  Syria,	  I	  will	  first	  
discuss	  Russian-­‐Egyptian	  arms	  sales	  from	  the	  1950	  to	  2010	  and	  a	  similar	  
description	  of	  military	  trade	  between	  Syrian	  and	  the	  USSR	  will	  follow.	  I	  will	  then	  
compare	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  dealt	  with	  both	  of	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  
nations	  and	  summarize	  my	  findings	  addressing	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  main	  objective	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  USSR’s	  goal	  was	  to	  gain	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  these	  
sales	  as	  leverage	  in	  the	  Arab	  nations	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  them	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table	  
with	  Israel	  and	  bring	  about	  a	  solution	  to	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  issue	  and	  gain	  the	  
international	  prestige	  that	  would	  come	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  	  
	  
Russian	  and	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  Syria	  and	  Egypt	  
Russian	  interest	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  particularly	  Syria,	  predates	  the	  creation	  
of	  the	  modern	  nation	  states,	  which	  came	  into	  being	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  at	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  I.	  	  Originally	  Russian	  interests	  in	  Syria	  came	  about	  
due	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Russian	  pilgrims	  traveling	  through	  the	  area	  on	  their	  way	  to	  
Palestine.	  	  En	  route	  they	  stopped	  at	  several	  holy	  sights	  in	  this	  region	  and	  this	  led	  to	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the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Imperial	  [Russian]	  Orthodox	  Society	  in	  Damascus.	  	  Despite	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  Society’s	  main	  objective	  was	  to	  see	  to	  the	  welfare	  of	  Russian	  
pilgrims,	  most	  of	  its	  efforts	  were	  put	  into	  establishing	  schools	  in	  Syria	  and	  thus	  
solidifying	  Russian	  ties	  with	  the	  region.	  
	   After	  the	  1917	  Bolshevik	  Revolution	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union,	  there	  was	  a	  break	  in	  Russian-­‐Syrian	  relations,	  but	  Moscow	  moved	  to	  
reestablish	  them	  in	  1944,	  two	  years	  before	  the	  country	  achieved	  independence	  from	  
the	  French	  mandate.	  	  The	  interest	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  Syria	  was	  a	  response	  to	  
several	  factors.	  	  The	  primary	  point	  of	  interest	  was	  the	  partial	  success	  of	  the	  Syrian	  
Socialist	  Party	  (the	  Ba’ath	  Party)	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Communist	  Party,	  
which	  was	  closely	  followed	  by	  the	  issue	  of	  growing	  Western	  influence	  in	  other	  
Middle	  Eastern	  nations,	  particularly	  US	  support	  of	  Israel32.	  Syria’s	  anti-­‐Israeli	  stance	  
also	  appealed	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  it	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  anti-­‐Western	  
sentiment	  and	  brought	  the	  two	  countries	  closer	  together33.	  	  	  Another	  attractive	  
factor	  about	  Syria	  was	  its	  large	  size	  and	  strategic	  position	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  
bordering	  Turkey,	  Lebanon,	  Israel,	  and	  Jordan.34	  	  
Before	  Hafez	  al-­‐Assad	  came	  to	  power	  in	  November	  1970,	  there	  were	  no	  
specific	  policy	  goals	  espoused	  by	  the	  Syrian	  government.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  policy	  can	  be	  
easily	  understood	  through	  the	  numerous	  coups	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Syria	  after	  its	  
                                                
32	  Freedman,19.	  
33	  Mott,	  2001;	  Glassman,	  1975.	  
34	  Prior	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  Israel	  in1948,	  Syria	  bordered	  the	  Palestinian	  Mandate.	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independence.	  	  This	  “political	  merry-­‐go-­‐round”	  made	  it	  easy	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  
gain	  a	  foothold	  as	  Syria’s	  ally35.	  However	  this	  emphasis	  on	  revolutionary	  rhetoric	  
that	  the	  USSR	  found	  so	  appealing	  did	  not	  last.	  However,	  despite	  Syria’s	  attractive	  
strategic	  qualities,	  it	  was	  not	  the	  USSR’s	  first	  choice	  for	  an	  alliance	  in	  the	  region.	  
	   The	  more	  attractive	  ally	  for	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  was	  
Egypt.	  	  Due	  to	  its	  position	  straddling	  the	  Suez	  Canal,	  Egypt	  would	  be	  an	  invaluable	  
for	  the	  Russian	  military.	  	  The	  Suez	  Canal	  would	  allow	  the	  Soviet	  navy	  access	  to	  the	  
Persian	  Gulf,	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  the	  south	  Pacific	  greatly	  increasing	  the	  USSR’s	  
sphere	  of	  influence.	  	  Despite	  the	  relative	  weakness	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  communist	  party	  
the	  significant	  strategic	  benefits	  of	  having	  Egypt	  as	  an	  ally	  propelled	  Soviet	  
cooperation	  with	  Egypt.	  	  The	  USSR’s	  wanted	  to	  keep	  up	  relations	  with	  Egypt,	  but	  
there	  was	  a	  break	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  1961	  due	  to	  increased	  repression	  of	  
the	  Egyptian	  communist	  movement	  by	  President	  Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser.	  	  However	  
following	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  leadership,	  there	  was	  a	  reapproachment	  
between	  the	  two	  nations	  in	  1964.	  Following	  Nasser’s	  death	  in	  September	  1970,	  
relations	  between	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  deteriorated	  rapidly.	  	  In	  1972,	  
President	  Anwar	  Sadat	  expelled	  Soviet	  advisers	  from	  Egypt	  and	  even	  though	  this	  did	  
not	  completely	  end	  Soviet-­‐Egyptian	  relations,	  it	  moved	  Egypt	  further	  away	  from	  the	  
USSR.	  	  In	  1976,	  Egypt	  canceled	  the	  Egyptian-­‐Soviet	  Friendship	  Treaty	  and	  in	  1979,	  
Egypt	  signed	  a	  peace	  treaty	  with	  Israel	  and	  was	  firmly	  placed	  in	  the	  Western	  camp.	  
                                                
35	  Howard,150. 
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   Since	  the	  USSR	  recognized	  it	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  leverage	  its	  arms	  sales	  
against	  Egypt,	  as	  Sadat	  was	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  the	  West,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  saw	  no	  
need	  to	  provide	  Egypt	  with	  additional	  shipments.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  peace	  treaty	  
between	  Egypt	  and	  Israel	  was	  already	  signed	  and	  therefore	  the	  USSR	  could	  not	  
achieve	  its	  main	  goal	  of	  brokering	  a	  peace	  deal	  between	  the	  two	  nations.	  	  Thus	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  turned	  to	  Syria	  who	  was	  more	  isolated	  than	  Egypt	  allowing	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  to	  act	  as	  the	  sole	  powerful	  ally	  and	  exert	  influence	  over	  Syrian	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
Also	  Syria	  had	  no	  peace	  treaty	  with	  Israel,	  which	  would	  allow	  the	  USSR	  to	  fulfill	  its	  
main	  objective	  for	  Soviet	  Middle	  Eastern	  policy.	  	  	  
The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  role,	  as	  chief	  arms	  supplier	  was	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  Soviet-­‐
Middle	  Eastern	  foreign	  policy.	  	  “Not	  merely	  designed	  as	  a	  method	  for	  excluding	  
Western	  influence	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Soviet	  military	  aid	  and	  logistical	  support	  of	  
President	  Assad’s	  (Alawai)	  military	  power	  base	  is	  additionally	  recognized	  as	  an	  
essential	  ingredient	  in	  maintaining	  a	  sympathetic	  ‘progressive’	  regime	  in	  power”36.	  	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  not	  Hafez	  al-­‐Assad’s	  number	  one	  fan,	  
Moscow	  was	  still	  afraid	  that	  if	  the	  Assad	  regime	  was	  not	  properly	  buttressed,	  it	  
would	  be	  overthrown	  by	  an	  anti-­‐Soviet	  group	  and	  the	  USSR	  would	  lose	  its	  foothold	  
in	  the	  area.	  	  This	  fear	  combined	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Camp	  David	  Accords	  in	  1979,	  
left	  Syria	  to	  act	  as	  the	  USSR’s	  sole	  influential	  ally	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  between	  1971	  
and	  1980,	  Soviet	  economic	  and	  technical	  assistance	  to	  Syria	  tripled.	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Arms	  Sales	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  Egypt	  
The	  first	  arms	  orders	  were	  placed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Gaza	  Raid	  conducted	  by	  
Israel	  on	  February	  28,	  1955,	  which	  left	  38	  Egyptian	  soldiers	  and	  8	  Israeli	  troops	  
dead37.	  	  Also	  known	  as	  Operation	  Black	  Arrow,	  the	  raid	  was	  meant	  to	  bypass	  the	  
Egyptian	  forces	  stationed	  in	  Gaza	  and	  target	  the	  water	  tower	  and	  railroad	  station	  
but	  the	  Israeli	  Defense	  Forces	  (IDF)	  stumbled	  onto	  Egyptian	  troops.	  	  While	  Nasser	  
resisted	  pressure	  from	  the	  Egyptian	  army	  to	  stage	  a	  counterattack,	  he	  did	  accept	  a	  
massive	  shipment	  of	  Soviet	  technology38.	  	  Among	  the	  technology	  that	  was	  provided	  
to	  him	  were	  100	  MiG-­‐17/	  Fresco	  planes,	  which	  had	  corrected	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  
that	  the	  MiG-­‐15	  experienced	  at	  higher	  altitudes39.	  	  
Following	  the	  1956	  conflict	  with	  Israel,	  the	  Egyptian	  government	  acquired	  a	  
large	  arsenal	  of	  Soviet	  technology,	  including	  fire	  control	  radar,	  Il-­‐28	  bomber	  aircraft,	  
and	  eight	  submarines.	  	  The	  Egyptian	  air	  force	  was	  updated	  with	  80	  MiG-­‐19	  Farmer	  
fighter	  jets	  in	  1958-­‐1959.	  	  The	  trade	  registers	  continue	  in	  this	  tone,	  emphasizing	  
large	  military	  hardware,	  such	  as	  aircraft,	  naval	  ships	  and	  submarines	  until	  1970.	  	  
Starting	  in	  1970,	  a	  shift	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  technology	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  
willing	  to	  sell	  the	  Egyptian	  government.	  	  The	  equipment	  delivered	  that	  year	  
consisted	  primarily	  of	  defensive	  technology,	  including	  100	  reconnaissance	  aerial	  
                                                
37	  Howard,	  141;	  Oren,	  25.	  
38	  Ibid;	  see	  Appendix	  C.	  
39	  “MiG-­‐17	  Fresco.”	  GlobalSecurity.org.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-­‐17.htm.	  [last	  accessed:	  12	  Aug	  2010.] 
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vehicles.	  	  From	  that	  point	  onward	  in	  the	  Soviet-­‐Egyptian	  the	  focus	  shifts	  to	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  
missiles	  and	  the	  acquisition	  of	  new	  radar	  systems	  that	  the	  Egyptians	  severely	  
needed.	  	  The	  plains	  that	  Egypt	  does	  receive	  are	  actually	  an	  older	  model	  than	  was	  
previously	  shipped40.	  	  	  The	  last	  transactions	  that	  occurred	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
and	  Egypt	  happened	  in	  1974,	  at	  which	  point	  there	  was	  no	  further	  trade	  until	  1994	  
when	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  sold	  Egypt	  another	  air	  search	  radar	  system	  and	  a	  
handful	  of	  anti-­‐tank	  missiles.	  	  Then	  starting	  in	  1999,	  Egypt	  received	  two	  new	  SAM	  
systems	  followed	  by	  the	  sale	  of	  portable	  SAMs	  in	  order	  to	  modernize	  the	  old	  ZSU-­‐23	  
anti	  aircraft	  gun41.	  	  
	  
Arms	  Sales	  between	  Syria	  and	  the	  USSR/Russia	  
As	  with	  the	  trade	  with	  Egypt,	  the	  first	  shipment	  of	  arms	  occurred	  in	  1955	  
with	  20	  Yak-­‐11	  trainer	  aircraft.	  	  This	  shipment	  was	  followed	  by	  25	  MiG-­‐15s	  
delivered	  between	  1955	  and	  1956.	  	  The	  MiG-­‐15	  was	  a	  state	  of	  the	  art	  aircraft	  that	  
was	  primarily	  designed	  for	  dogfights,	  although	  it	  had	  maneuvering	  problems	  at	  high	  
altitudes.	  	  This	  shipment	  of	  fighter	  jets	  was	  supplemented	  by	  a	  shipment	  of	  
transport	  aircraft	  and	  helicopters	  in	  1958.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  sales,	  during	  those	  five	  
years,	  it	  becomes	  obvious	  that	  they	  were	  all	  offensive	  in	  nature	  and	  meant	  to	  
                                                
40	  In	  1967	  Egypt	  received	  MiG-­‐19	  but	  in	  1971	  Russia	  ships	  them	  MiG-­‐17s	  instead.	  
41“ZSU-­‐23-­‐4	  Shilka	  23mm	  Antiaircraft	  Gun.”	  GlobalSecurity.org.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/zsu-­‐23-­‐4.htm.	  [last	  accessed	  10	  October	  
2010.] 
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provide	  the	  Syrian	  army	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  engage	  the	  Israeli	  forces	  on	  the	  
battlefield.	  
Throughout	  the	  early	  1960s	  of	  the	  arms	  trade,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  bombers	  
shipped	  and	  some	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  until	  1967	  when	  the	  USSR	  begins	  
to	  supply	  large	  quantities	  of	  weaponry.	  	  There	  are	  500	  mobile	  rocket	  launchers	  
ordered	  by	  the	  Syrian	  in	  1967,	  which	  were	  delivered	  between	  1967	  and	  1969.	  	  This	  
weaponry	  is	  supplemented	  by	  a	  S-­‐75	  Dvina	  SAM	  system,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  counter	  Israeli	  
airpower.	  	  This	  missile	  defense	  system	  was	  exceptionally	  important	  for	  Syria	  due	  to	  
Syria’s	  loss	  of	  the	  Golan	  Heights	  to	  Israel	  in	  the	  1967	  Six	  Day	  War.	  	  The	  loss	  of	  this	  
strategic	  position,	  resulted	  in	  Syria’s	  need	  to	  compensate	  by	  getting	  more	  military	  
technology	  to	  balance	  out	  Israel’s	  military	  superiority	  and	  protect	  its	  air	  space.	  	  	  
Leading	  up	  to	  the	  Yom	  Kippur	  War	  of	  1973,	  there	  were	  more	  deliveries	  of	  
fighter	  jets	  including	  forty	  Su-­‐7B	  fighter	  ground	  attack	  aircraft,	  10	  MiG-­‐17s,	  and	  25	  
MiG-­‐21	  PFMs.	  	  These	  shipments	  were	  followed	  by	  further	  sales	  of	  offensive	  aircraft,	  
bolstered	  by	  the	  2K12	  Kvadrat	  SAM	  system,	  which	  was	  procured	  by	  Syria	  in	  1973.	  	  
Following	  the	  losses	  in	  the	  Yom	  Kippur	  War,	  the	  USSR	  replaced	  much	  of	  Syria’s	  lost	  
hardware.	  	  There	  were	  50	  new	  MiG-­‐21	  PFMs	  and	  another	  86	  MiG-­‐21MFs,	  the	  first	  
third	  generation	  aircraft	  in	  the	  Russian	  arsenal,	  delivered	  in	  197442.	  	  This	  pattern	  of	  
supplying	  Syria	  with	  offensive	  weaponry	  continues	  thought	  the	  1970s.	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  “MiG-­‐21	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In	  1982,	  the	  USSR	  supplied	  the	  Syrian	  army	  with	  everything	  it	  could	  desire	  
including	  50	  new	  MiG-­‐23	  MLDs	  and	  15	  MiG-­‐25	  PDs,	  which	  despite	  its	  outdated	  
radar	  was	  a	  very	  impressive	  aircraft43.	  	  	  Following	  the	  1982	  War	  in	  Lebanon,	  the	  
USSR	  continued	  to	  resupply	  Syria’s	  stores	  with	  various	  types	  of	  missiles,	  including	  
surface-­‐to-­‐surface,	  anti-­‐tank	  and	  anti-­‐ship,	  but	  mostly	  focusing	  on	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  ones.	  	  In	  
1986,	  Syria	  once	  again	  updated	  its	  aircrafts	  through	  a	  shipment	  of	  48	  MiG-­‐29	  
Fulcrum	  fighters,	  a	  mere	  six	  years	  after	  they	  appeared	  in	  the	  Soviet	  air	  force44.	  	  The	  
MiG-­‐29	  had	  a	  much	  improved	  radar	  system	  over	  the	  MiG-­‐25	  and	  the	  two	  fins	  gave	  it	  
greater	  stability	  in	  the	  air,	  making	  it	  comparable	  to	  some	  Western	  aircraft	  of	  the	  
time45.	  	  	  
	   As	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  the	  relationship	  between	  Moscow	  and	  Damascus	  
changed	  with	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Starting	  in	  1992	  until	  the	  meeting	  
between	  Putin	  and	  Assad	  in	  2005,	  the	  technology	  that	  was	  supplied	  by	  Russia	  
consisted	  primarily	  of	  spare	  parts	  and	  SAMs	  that	  were	  modified	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  
Israel	  and	  the	  United	  States46.	  	  After	  the	  2005	  meeting	  in	  Moscow,	  the	  Russian	  
government	  agreed	  to	  provide	  Syria	  with	  a	  new	  mobile	  air-­‐defense	  (AD)	  system	  but	  
has	  yet	  to	  complete	  making	  deliveries	  and	  the	  new	  MiG	  31M/Foxbat-­‐B	  modernized	  
fighter	  aircraft	  which	  were	  ordered	  in	  2007,	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  delivered	  three	  years	  
                                                
43	  “MiG-­‐25	  Foxbat.”	  GlobalSecurity.org	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-­‐25.htm.	  	  
44	  “MiG-­‐29	  Fulcrum.”	  Global	  Security.org.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mig-­‐29.htm.	  	  
45	  Ibid.	  
46	  See	  Appendix	  B. 
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later.	  	  Tsuganok’s	  article	  sheds	  some	  light	  on	  this	  development	  in	  that	  he	  points	  out	  
toward	  the	  end	  of	  his	  article	  that	  while	  Moscow	  and	  Syria	  have	  reached	  a	  new	  stage	  
in	  their	  relationship.	  	  Moscow	  is	  worried	  that	  Syria	  will	  place	  unnecessary	  
roadblocks	  on	  the	  road	  to	  mutual	  friendship	  by	  not	  fulfilling	  its	  part	  of	  the	  bargain	  
and	  seeking	  to	  diversify	  its	  military	  arsenal47.	  
	  
Comparison	  of	  Syria	  and	  Egypt	  
Upon	  examination	  of	  the	  military	  trade	  history	  concerning	  the	  arms	  transfers	  
between	  the	  Soviet	  Union/Russian	  to	  Syria	  and	  Egypt	  from	  1950	  to	  2009,	  several	  
interesting	  patterns	  emerge48.	  	  	  The	  first	  arms	  transfers	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  took	  
place	  in	  1955	  to	  both	  nations	  and	  both	  Syria	  and	  Egypt	  were	  provided	  with	  modern	  
weaponry	  however	  there	  were	  some	  differenced	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  Soviet-­‐
Syrian	  and	  Soviet-­‐Egyptian	  relations.	  	  Throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  Egypt	  was	  
definitely	  the	  favored	  partner	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  when	  
Syria	  received	  more	  modern	  technology,	  such	  instances	  were	  the	  result	  of	  breaks	  in	  
Soviet-­‐Egyptian	  relations.	  	  This	  patterns	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  transfers	  for	  1961	  and	  
1964.	  	  Once	  Egypt	  had	  negotiated	  a	  disarmament	  with	  Israel	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  
                                                
47	  Tsuganok,	  2006;	  Podtserob,	  2008.	  
48	  Unfortunately	  the	  SIPRI	  database	  did	  not	  have	  data	  from	  1994-­‐1997,	  to	  my	  analysis	  will	  assume	  
that	  no	  new	  equipment	  was	  sold	  during	  the	  span	  of	  those	  four	  years. 
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United	  States	  in	  1974,	  the	  USSR	  backed	  off	  and	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  increase	  its	  
support	  of	  Syria49.	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Hafez	  al-­‐Assad	  did	  not	  cooperate	  with	  Soviet	  policy	  
regarding	  a	  number	  of	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Liberation	  
Organization	  in	  Middle	  Eastern	  politics	  or	  want	  to	  take	  part	  in	  a	  talks	  with	  Israel,	  the	  
USSR	  continued	  to	  deal	  with	  him50.	  	  The	  USSR	  knew	  that	  its	  perceived	  control	  over	  
Syrian	  politics	  was	  the	  only	  way	  that	  either	  the	  US	  or	  Israel	  would	  allow	  the	  USSR	  to	  
take	  part	  in	  a	  bilateral	  conference	  dealing	  with	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  issue,	  thus	  the	  
Soviets	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  continue	  their	  support	  of	  Syria.	  	  	  Due	  to	  the	  its	  
ideological	  stance,	  the	  USSR	  was	  very	  limited	  in	  whom	  it	  could	  deal.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  
success	  on	  the	  diplomatic	  arena	  was	  complicated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  Arab	  victories	  on	  the	  
battlefield.	  	  In	  order	  to	  not	  lose	  face	  and	  reassure	  the	  international	  community	  that	  
the	  Soviet	  military	  hardware	  was	  comparable	  to	  US	  technology,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
continued	  to	  supply	  Syria	  with	  increased	  quantities	  of	  modern	  arms.	  
Once	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  fell,	  Russia	  no	  longer	  had	  the	  monetary	  ability	  to	  
supply	  the	  Syrian	  government	  with	  massive	  amounts	  of	  equipment	  and	  prestige	  was	  
moved	  to	  the	  back	  of	  Moscow’s	  agenda.	  	  Syria’s	  refusal	  to	  repay	  Soviet	  debts	  and	  it’s	  
desire	  to	  diversify	  it’s	  military	  holdings	  leg	  to	  a	  halt	  in	  Russian-­‐Syrian	  relations	  until	  
Bashar	  al-­‐Assad’s	  visit	  to	  Russia	  in	  2005.	  	  By	  that	  point	  in	  time,	  the	  Russian	  economy	  
had	  recovered	  from	  earlier	  problems	  and	  President	  Putin	  was	  ready	  to	  reaffirm	  
                                                
49	  Cleaveland,	  377.	  
50	  Norton,	  267. 
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Russia’s	  role	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  In	  order	  to	  restart	  the	  relationship	  with	  
Damascus,	  he	  forgave	  73%	  of	  Syria’s	  Cold	  War	  debts	  and	  two	  years	  later	  the	  two	  
countries	  concluded	  a	  new	  military	  contract	  to	  provide	  Syria	  with	  MiG-­‐31s	  and	  a	  
shipment	  of	  Yakhot	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles.	  	  While	  there	  has	  been	  some	  controversy	  
surrounding	  both	  sales,	  in	  early	  2010,	  the	  Russian	  government	  announced	  that	  they	  
would	  go	  ahead	  with	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  Yakhot	  missiles	  in	  spite	  of	  concerns	  voiced	  by	  
the	  Israeli	  government	  that	  the	  missiles	  would	  fall	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  Hezbollah.	  	  Due	  
to	  their	  low	  flying	  altitude	  and	  speed,	  they	  are	  virtually	  undetectable	  by	  radar,	  
making	  them	  difficult	  to	  intercept51.	  	  Russia’s	  pursuit	  of	  Syria	  as	  a	  partner	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  Syria	  is	  still	  central	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  peace	  
in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  this	  alliance	  is	  a	  way	  for	  Russia	  to	  be	  part	  of	  possible	  bilateral	  








                                                
51	  “Rossiyskii	  yakhotu	  v	  Sirii,	  ili	  o	  chom	  zabuvaet	  Izrael’	  i	  Seshea.”	  [Russian	  Yakhots	  in	  Syria,	  or	  what	  
Israel	  and	  the	  USA	  are	  forgetting	  about.]	  Pravda.ru.	  21	  September	  2010.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.pravda.ru/world/asia/middleeast/21-­‐09-­‐2010/1050400-­‐yahont-­‐0/.	  [last	  accessed:	  27	  
September	  2010.]	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Chapter	  3:	  Conclusions	  and	  Analysis	  
	   As	  has	  been	  illustrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Moscow	  still	  has	  a	  vested	  
interest	  in	  Syria	  and	  has	  continued	  to	  this	  day	  to	  use	  arms	  transactions	  as	  an	  
extension	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  briefly	  review	  my	  findings	  from	  the	  
previous	  chapter	  and	  then	  I	  will	  address	  how	  these	  arms	  sales	  have	  impacted	  the	  
balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  
	   	  
Summary:	  Evidence	  and	  Analysis	   	  
	   Moscow	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  involvement	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  this	  paper	  
examines	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Moscow’s	  foreign	  policy	  has	  affected	  this	  area	  of	  
the	  world.	  	  In	  my	  research	  I	  found	  Moscow’s	  weapons	  sales	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  be	  
motivated	  by	  prestige	  seeking	  behavior.	  	  	  
Throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  the	  early	  1960s,	  the	  Soviet	  government	  continued	  
to	  supply	  both	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  with	  weaponry,	  however	  Egypt	  was	  most	  definitely	  
the	  preferred	  partner.	  	  While	  the	  lack	  of	  policy	  goals	  for	  the	  Syrian	  government	  
throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  made	  it	  easy	  for	  the	  USSR	  to	  gain	  influence	  
through	  weapon’s	  sales,	  the	  political	  turnover	  was	  so	  rapid	  that	  there	  was	  
essentially	  no	  need	  to	  sell	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  weapons	  to	  gain	  the	  necessary	  outcome	  
of	  an	  ally.	  	  Influence	  in	  Egypt	  meant	  getting	  access	  to	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  and	  would	  
allow	  Soviet	  ships	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  canal	  and	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  Red	  Sea	  and	  the	  
Indian	  Ocean,	  extending	  the	  USSR’s	  influence	  into	  the	  Gulf	  region	  and	  the	  south	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Pacific.	  	  However	  President	  Sadat	  chose	  to	  move	  the	  Egyptian	  government	  away	  
from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  relationship	  deteriorated	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  
finally	  came	  to	  complete	  halt	  in	  1974,	  when	  Egypt	  signed	  a	  disarmament	  pact	  with	  
Israel.	  	  At	  that	  point	  the	  USSR	  could	  no	  longer	  pursue	  its	  objective	  to	  negotiate	  a	  
peace	  deal	  between	  the	  two	  nations,	  and	  so	  arms	  shipments	  ceased.	  	  	  
The	  Syrian	  government	  was	  provided	  weapons	  until	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  at	  which	  point	  Moscow	  was	  no	  longer	  in	  a	  financial	  position	  to	  continue	  its	  
aid.	  	  At	  that	  point	  in	  time,	  Russia’s	  economic	  situation	  took	  precedence	  over	  the	  
need	  to	  gain	  international	  prestige.	  	  However	  as	  part	  of	  President	  Putin’s	  agenda,	  
military	  transfers	  restarted	  in	  2005	  after	  a	  meeting	  with	  President	  Bashar	  al-­‐Assad.	  	  
These	  arms	  sales	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  widespread	  opinion	  in	  Russia	  that	  Syria	  is	  an	  
essential	  player	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process.	  
	   Also	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  main	  goal	  for	  Russian	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  
to	  achieve	  a	  peace	  treaty	  between	  Israel	  and	  Syria,	  Moscow	  has	  been	  very	  careful	  to	  
not	  sell	  Syria	  any	  game-­‐changing	  weaponry.	  	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  several	  recent	  
transactions	  between	  Syria	  and	  Russia.	  	  The	  200	  Igla	  portable	  SAMs	  that	  were	  
delivered	  in	  2006,	  were	  modified	  for	  use	  on	  vehicles,	  helicopters	  and	  ships	  at	  the	  
behest	  of	  Israel,	  making	  them	  easier	  to	  track.	  Furthermore,	  the	  four	  MiG	  
31M/Foxhound-­‐B	  fighter	  aircraft	  that	  were	  ordered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  same	  military	  
agreement	  in	  2007	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  delivered52.	  	  The	  modernized	  aircraft	  would	  come	  
                                                
52	  Two	  of	  the	  Foxhound-­‐B	  aircraft	  were	  meant	  for	  spare	  parts	  for	  the	  other	  aircraft;	  there	  is	  also	  
some	  discrepancy	  over	  the	  number	  of	  Foxhound-­‐B	  plains	  that	  were	  ordered.	  	  The	  SIPRI	  database	  has	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with	  5th	  generation	  aircraft,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  upgrade	  from	  the	  MiG-­‐29	  
fighters	  that	  were	  delivered	  to	  Syria	  between	  1987	  and	  198853.	  	  Additionally	  Russia	  
has	  also	  refused	  to	  provide	  Syria	  with	  the	  S-­‐300	  missiles	  defense	  system	  and	  instead	  
supplied	  Damascus	  with	  the	  Pantsyr-­‐S1,	  which	  is	  an	  older	  outdated	  model54.	  
	  
Further	  Implications	  of	  Research	  
	   After	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  fell	  in	  1991,	  it	  took	  Moscow	  about	  a	  decade	  to	  recover	  
from	  the	  crisis	  of	  losing	  its	  empire	  and	  reform	  its	  policy	  in	  a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  	  	  
The	  loss	  of	  the	  Soviet	  empire	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  loss	  of	  prestige	  in	  the	  
international	  community	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  Great	  Power	  status,	  something	  that	  Russia	  
has	  been	  in	  the	  process	  of	  regaining	  for	  the	  past	  twenty	  years.	  	  During	  the	  years	  
immediately	  following	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  USSR,	  the	  loss	  of	  prestige	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  
divergence	  from	  the	  “civilized”	  Western	  world	  but	  President	  Putin	  corrected	  this	  
direction	  in	  Russian	  political	  thinking	  in	  2001	  when	  he	  emphasized	  Russia’s	  role	  
throughout	  history	  as	  a	  Great	  Power55.	  	  Since	  then,	  Russia	  has	  been	  steadily	  
rebuilding	  its	  role	  as	  an	  arms	  supplier	  and	  using	  those	  arms	  to	  regain	  the	  trust	  of	  
past	  allies.	  	  Syria	  however	  is	  not	  the	  only	  country	  to	  whom	  Russia	  sells	  military	  
hardware.	  	  One	  of	  the	  largest	  recipients	  of	  Russian	  military	  technology	  is	  India,	  a	  
fast	  growing	  economy.	  	  
                                                                                                                                            
the	  number	  at	  four	  (two	  of	  which	  are	  for	  spare	  parts)	  but	  several	  news	  articles	  have	  the	  number	  to	  
be	  as	  high	  as	  eight.	  
53	  Some	  MiG-­‐29UB	  trainer	  aircraft	  were	  included	  in	  that	  order.	  
54	  Podtserob,	  2009.	  
55	  Noyman,	  179. 
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   Additionally	  during	  the	  past	  year,	  the	  Russian	  navy	  has	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  effort	  to	  
expand	  arms	  trade	  with	  the	  Gulf	  States,	  attending	  two	  military	  exhibitions	  in	  2010.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  recent	  economic	  crisis,	  the	  Gulf	  states	  still	  have	  large	  amounts	  of	  
money	  to	  spend	  on	  defense	  technologies	  and	  the	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Countries	  (GCC)	  
looking	  to	  increase	  spending	  on	  military	  technology	  by	  20%	  in	  201056.	  	  While	  it	  is	  
obvious	  that	  Russian	  sales	  to	  Syria	  are	  an	  attempt	  to	  gain	  access	  into	  the	  Israeli-­‐
Palestinian	  peace	  process,	  one	  wonders	  what	  is	  motivating	  Moscow’s	  desire	  to	  
break	  into	  the	  Gulf	  arms	  market.	  	  Is	  it	  solely	  the	  result	  of	  economics?	  Or	  is	  this	  
motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  gain	  prestige	  in	  another	  area	  of	  the	  Middle	  East?	  
	   Russia’s	  relationship	  with	  Iran	  is	  also	  very	  controversial.	  	  For	  most	  of	  2009,	  
Russia	  has	  insisted	  that	  it	  would	  go	  ahead	  with	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  S-­‐300	  AD	  system,	  a	  
highly	  sophisticated	  missile	  defense	  system	  that	  is	  intended	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  
high	  value	  targets.	  	  There	  were	  several	  delays	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  missiles	  but	  
Moscow	  seemed	  to	  hold	  firm	  in	  the	  face	  of	  criticism	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
Israel.	  	  In	  September	  2010,	  though	  President	  Medvedev	  announced	  the	  cancellation	  
of	  the	  sale	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Iran	  had	  already	  put	  forth	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  money	  for	  
the	  technology57.	  	  	  
                                                
56	  “GCC	  arms	  race?	  An	  issue	  of	  safety	  and	  stability?”	  The	  Peninsula	  (Qatar).	  	  6	  October	  2010.	  
Available	  at:	  http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/q/55-­‐khalid-­‐al-­‐jaber/128219-­‐gcc-­‐arms-­‐race-­‐an-­‐
issue-­‐of-­‐safety-­‐and-­‐stability.html.	  [last	  accessed:	  10	  October	  2010].	  
57	  “Iranian	  legislator	  wants	  Russia	  to	  be	  sued	  over	  missile	  contract.”	  CNN	  International.	  11	  October	  
2010.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/10/11/iran.russia.missiles/.	  [last	  
accessed:	  11	  October	  2010]	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   Despite	  Tehran’s	  displeasure	  with	  Moscow’s	  decision	  to	  provide	  military	  
technology,	  there	  is	  continued	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  on	  the	  
Bushehr	  nuclear	  facility,	  which,	  much	  like	  the	  missile	  sale,	  is	  being	  criticized	  by	  the	  
West.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  move	  on	  Russia’s	  behalf	  is	  a	  way	  of	  inserting	  itself	  into	  
another	  internationally	  important	  issue	  to	  raise	  its	  credibility	  as	  a	  leader.	  	  But	  
Russia	  has	  a	  long	  road	  ahead	  of	  it	  if	  it	  wants	  to	  regain	  Iran’s	  trust	  enough	  to	  act	  as	  a	  




















AD	   	   Air	  Defense	  
APC	   	   Armored	  personnel	  carrier	  
ASW	   	   Anti-­‐submarine	  warfare	  
AV	   	   Armored	  vehicle	  
BVRAAM	   Beyond	  visual	  range	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  
FAC(M)	   Forward	  Air	  Control	  (military)	  
FAC(T)	   Forward	  air	  control	  (tank)	  
FGA	   	   Fighter	  ground	  attack	  
HE	   	   High-­‐explosive	  
IFV	   	   Infantry	  fighting	  vehicle	  
MRL	   	   Mobile	  rocket	  launcher	  
SAM	   	   Surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  	  
SRAAM	   Short-­‐range	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  
SSM	   	   Surface-­‐to-­‐surface	  missile	  





















Appendix	  B:	  Transfers	  of	  aircraft,	  naval	  technology	  and	  missiles	  from	  
USSR/Russia	  to	  Syria	  from	  1950-­2009	  
	  








produced	   Comments	  
36	   96K9	  Pantsyr-­‐S1	   Mobile	  AD	  system	   2006	   2008-­‐09	   18	  
part	  of	  $400-­‐730	  
m.	  deal;	  no.	  could	  
be	  as	  high	  as	  50	  
850	   9M311/SA-­‐19	  Grison	   SAM	   2006	   2008-­‐09	   350	  
part	  of	  $400	  m.	  
deal;	  for	  Pantsyr	  
AD	  system	  
	  	   9K40	  Buk/SA-­‐17	   SAM	  system	   2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   9M317/SA-­‐17	  Grizzly	   SAM	   2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
2009	  




version;	  2	  more	  for	  
spare	  parts;	  status	  
uncertain	  
2008	   SAME	  AS	  2009	  
2007	   SAME	  AS	  2009	  
2006	   200	   Igla/SA-­‐18	  Grouse	   Portable	  SAM	   2005	   2006	   200	  
For	  use	  on	  
vehicles/hicopters/	  
ships	  instead	  of	  
portable	  launchers	  
after	  Israeli	  and	  US	  
pressure	  
1500	   9M	  119/AT-­‐11	  Sniper	   Anti-­‐tank	  missile	   1998	   2000-­‐05	   1500	  
For	  modernized	  T-­‐
72	  tank	  2005	  
500	   9M	  131/AT-­‐13	  Saxhorn	   Anti-­‐tank	  missile	   1998	   2000-­‐05	   500	   	  	  
2004	   SAME	  AS	  2005	  
2003	   SAME	  AS	  2005	  
2002	   SAME	  AS	  2005	  
2001	   SAME	  AS	  2005	  
2000	   SAME	  AS	  2005	  
1999	   SAME	  AS	  2005	  
1998	   1000	   9M	  133	  Komet/	  AT-­‐14	   Anti-­‐tank	  missile	   1998	   1998-­‐99	   1000	   	  	  
1994-­‐97	   NO	  DATA	  
 37 
1993	   149	   V-­‐46	   Diesal	  engine	  (AV)	   1991	   1992-­‐93	   139	  
for	  149	  T-­‐72	  M1	  
tanks	  
1992	   	  	   SAME	  AS	  1993	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
1991	   	  	   SAME	  AS	  1993	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  




2	   Ka-­‐27PL/	  Helix-­‐A	   ASW	  helicopter	   1988	   1990	   2	   Ka-­‐28	  version	  
2300	   BMP-­‐1	   IFV	   1977	   1977-­‐89	   2300	   	  	  
1250	   T-­‐72	   tank	   1978	   1979-­‐89	   1250	   	  	  
2000	   9M	  111/AT4	  Spigot	   Anti-­‐tank	  missile	   1980	   1981-­‐89	   2000	   incl.	  for	  BRDM-­‐2	  tank	  destroyer	  
1989	  
1500	   Strela-­‐3/SA-­‐14	  Gremlin	   Portable	  SAM	  	   1985	   1987-­‐89	   1500	   	  	  
43	   9K33	  Osa/SA-­‐8	   mobile	  SAM	  system	   1982	   1982-­‐88	   43	   	  	  
1500	   9M33/SA-­‐18	  Gecko	   SAM	   1982	   1982-­‐88	   1500	  
incl.	  replacing	  
missiles	  used	  in	  
Lebanon	  in	  1982	  
against	  Israel	  
36	   BM-­‐22/9P140	  Uragan	   MRL	   1986	   1987-­‐88	   36	   	  	  
48	   MiG-­‐29/Fulcrum-­‐A	   fighter	  aircraft	   1986	   1987-­‐88	   48	   incl.	  some	  MiG-­‐29UB	  version	  
200	   R-­‐27/AA-­‐10	  Alamo	   BVRAAM	   1986	   1987-­‐88	   200	   for	  MiG-­‐29	  jets	  
1000	   R-­‐60/AA-­‐8	  Aphid	   SRAAM	   1986	   1987-­‐88	   1000	   for	  MiG-­‐23MF/BN	  &	  MiG29	  
50	   9M79/SS-­‐21	  Scarab	  	   SSM	   1987	   1988	   50	   	  	  
100	   BMP-­‐2	   IFV	   1987	   1987-­‐88	   100	   	  	  
1988	  
6	   OTR-­‐21/SS-­‐21	  	   SSM	  launcher	   1987	   1988	   6	   	  	  
36	   P-­‐35/SS-­‐C1	  Sepal	   Coast	  defense	  missiles	   1986	   1987	   36	   	  	  1987	  
6	   SS-­‐C-­‐1	  Sepal	   Coast	  defense	  system	   1986	   1987	   6	   	  	  
550	   Strela-­‐1/SA-­‐9	  Gaskin	   SAM	   1978	   1980-­‐87	   550	   	  	  
99	   AI-­‐25/DV-­‐2	   Turbofan	   1979	   1980-­‐86	   99	   for	  combat	  aircraft	  
290	   2S1	  122mm	   self-­‐propelled	  gun	   1981	   1982-­‐86	   290	  
no.	  delivered	  could	  
be	  more	  than	  400	  
4	   9K37	  Gang/SA-­‐11	   SAM	  system	   1983	   1986	   4	   	  	  
400	   9M38/SA-­‐11	  Gadfly	   SAM	   1983	   1986	   400	   	  	  
6	   4K40/SS-­‐C-­‐3	  CDS	   Coast	  defense	  system	   1984	   1985-­‐86	   6	   	  	  
60	   9K35	  ZREB-­‐BD/SA-­‐13	  
Mobile	  SAM	  
System	   1984	   1985-­‐86	   60	   	  	  
400	   9M113/AT-­‐5	  Spandrel	  
Anti-­‐tank	  
missiles	   1984	   1984-­‐87	   400	   	  	  
1986	  
96	   P-­‐15M/SS-­‐N	  2CStyx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1984	   1985-­‐86	   1500	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50	   Mi-­‐24D/Mi-­‐25/Hind-­‐D	  
Combat	  
helicopter	   1979	   1980-­‐85	   50	   	  	  
250	   R-­‐40/AA-­‐6	  Acrid	   BVRAAM	   1979	   1980-­‐85	   250	   for	  MiG-­‐25	  Combat	  aircraft	  
60	   Su-­‐22/Fitter-­‐H/J/K	   FGA	  aircraft	   1979	   1979-­‐85	   60	   Incl.	  some	  Su-­‐22	  combat	  aircraft	  
2000	   9M111/AT-­‐4	  Spigot	   anti-­‐tank	  missiles	   1980	   1981-­‐89	   2000	   incl.	  for	  BRDM-­‐2	  tank	  destroyer	  
290	   2S1	  122mm	  	   Self-­‐propelled	  gun	   1981	   1982-­‐85	   290	  
No.	  could	  be	  up	  to	  
400	  
55	   S3	  152mm	   Self-­‐propelled	  gun	   1981	   1982-­‐85	   55	   	  	  
43	   9K33	  OSA/SA-­‐8	   Mobile	  SAM	  system	   1982	   1982-­‐88	   43	   	  	  
1500	   9M33/SA-­‐8	  Gecko	   SAM	   1982	   1982-­‐88	   1500	  
Incl.	  replacing	  
missiles	  usein	  in	  
Lebanon	  1982	  
against	  Israel	  
4	   Big	  Back	   Air	  search	  radar	   1982	   1982-­‐85	   4	   for	  use	  with	  8	  SA-­‐5c	  SAM	  system	  
50	   MiG-­‐23ML/Flogger-­‐G	   Fighter	  aircraft	   1982	   1983-­‐85	   50	   MiG-­‐23MLD	  version	  
1250	   R-­‐13S/AA-­‐25	  Atoll	   SRAAM	   1982	   1982-­‐85	   1250	   for	  various	  combat	  aircraft	  
400	   R-­‐23R/T/AA-­‐7	  Apex	   BVRAAM	   1982	   1982-­‐85	   400	   for	  MiG-­‐23MF/MLD	  combat	  aircraft	  
8	   S-­‐200	  Angara/SA-­‐5	   SAM	  system	   1982	   1982-­‐85	   8	  
delivered	  in	  
reaction	  to	  Israeli	  
success	  in	  attacks	  
on	  Syrian	  forces	  in	  
Lebanon;	  manned	  
by	  Soviet	  troops	  
until	  1985	  
96	   S-­‐200/SA-­‐5	  Gammon	   SAM	   1982	   1982-­‐85	   96	   	  	  
6	   I40mm	  RL	   Naval	  MRL	   1983	   1984-­‐85	   6	  
on	  3	  ex-­‐Soviet	  Navy	  
Polnocny	  B	  Type	  
landing	  ships	  
15	   MiG-­‐25PD/Foxbat-­‐E	   fighter	  aircraft	   1983	   1984-­‐85	   15	   	  	  
6	   4K40/SS-­‐C-­‐3	  CDS	   Caost	  defense	  system	   1984	   1985-­‐86	   6	   	  	  
60	   9K35	  Zreb-­‐BD/SA-­‐13	   Mobile	  SAM	  system	   1984	   1985-­‐86	   60	   	  	  
1985	  
400	   9M113/AT-­‐5	  Spandrel	  
Anti-­‐tank	  
missiles	   1984	   1984-­‐87	   400	   	  	  
 39 
2	   Mi-­‐14PL/Haze-­‐A	   ASW	  helicopter	   1984	   1984-­‐85	   20	  
possibly	  incl.	  coms	  
Mi-­‐14PS	  SAR	  
version	  
96	   P-­‐15M/SS-­‐N-­‐2C	  Styx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1984	   1985-­‐86	   96	  
P-­‐20	  (SS-­‐C-­‐3)	  
version	  for	  coast	  
defense	  system	  
	  
1500	   Strela-­‐1/SA-­‐13	  Gopher	   SAM	   1984	   1985-­‐86	   1500	   	  	  
4	   Long	  Track	   Air	  search	  radar	   1982	   1983-­‐84	   4	   	  	  
4	   Osa/Type-­‐205	   FAC(M)	   1982	   1982-­‐84	   4	   Osa-­‐2	  version	  
32	   P-­‐15M/SS-­‐N-­‐2C	  Styx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1982	   1982-­‐84	   32	   for	  Osa-­‐2	  Class	  FAC	  
1984	  
2	   PRV-­‐9/Thin	  Skin	   Height-­‐finding	  radar	   1982	   198-­‐84	   2	   	  	  
15000	   Strela-­‐2/SA-­‐7	  Grail	   Portable	  SAM	   1969	   1970-­‐83	   15000	   Incl.	  some	  SA-­‐N-­‐5	  naval	  version	  
25	   Mi-­‐8T/Hip-­‐C	   Helicopter	   1978	   1979-­‐83	   25	   	  	  
5	   VR-­‐3	  REIS	   UAV	   1980	   1981-­‐83	   5	   	  	  
10	   MiG-­‐25RB/Foxbat-­‐B	   Reconnaisance	  aircraft	   1981	   1982-­‐83	   8	  
Incl.	  2	  MiG-­‐
25PU/RU	  version	  
50	   9M79/SS-­‐21	  Scarab	   SSM	   1982	   1983	   50	   	  	  
45	   MiG23ML/Flogger-­‐G	   Fighter	  aircraft	   1982	   1982-­‐83	   45	   Probably	  incl.	  some	  MiG-­‐23UB	  
1983	  
6	   OTR-­‐21/SS-­‐21	  Scarab	   SSM	  launcher	   1982	   1983	   6	   	  	  
350	   5V27/SA-­‐3B	  Goa	   SAM	   1981	   1982	   350	   	  	  
20	   Mi-­‐2/Hoplite	   Helicopter	   1981	   1981-­‐82	   20	   	  	  
10	   S-­‐125M/SA-­‐3B	   SAM	  system	   1981	   1981-­‐82	   10	   	  	  
4	   Osa/Type-­‐205	   FAC(M)	   1982	   1982-­‐84	   4	   Osa-­‐2	  version	  
1982	  
32	   P-­‐15M/SS-­‐N-­‐2C	  Styx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1982	   1982-­‐84	   32	   	  	  
20	   9K33	  Osa/SA-­‐8	   Mobile	  SAM	  system	   1977	   1979-­‐81	   20	   	  	  
650	   R-­‐13S/AA-­‐25	  Atoll	   SRAAM	   1977	   1977-­‐81	   650	  
for	  MiG-­‐23BN,	  Su-­‐
20	  and	  MiG21	  MF	  
ccombat	  aircraft	  
30	   2K12	  Kvadrat/SA-­‐6A	   SAM	  system	   1978	   1978-­‐81	   30	   	  	  
1800	   3M9/SA-­‐6	  Gainful	   SAM	   1978	   1978-­‐81	   1800	   	  	  
600	   9M33/SA-­‐8	  Gecko	   SAM	   1978	   1979-­‐81	   600	   	  	  
45	   MiG-­‐23BN/Flogger-­‐H	   FGA	  aircraft	   1978	   1979-­‐81	   45	   	  	  
550	   Strela-­‐1/SA-­‐9	  Gaskin	   SAM	   1978	   1980-­‐87	   550	   	  	  
150	   BM-­‐21	  Grad	  122mm	   MRL	   1979	   1980-­‐82	   150	   	  	  
250	   R-­‐40/AA-­‐6Acrid	   BVRAAM	   1979	   1980-­‐85	   250	   for	  MiG-­‐25	  
60	   Su-­‐22/Fitter-­‐H/J/K	   FGA	  aircraft	   1979	   1979-­‐85	   60	   Incl.	  some	  Su-­‐22U/UM	  version	  
1981	  
2000	   9M111/AT-­‐4	  Spigot	   Anti-­‐tank	  missiles	   1980	   1981-­‐89	   2000	  
Incl.	  for	  BRDM-­‐2	  
tank	  destroyer	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8	   M-­‐240	  240mm	   Mortar	   1980	   1981	   8	   	  	  	  
5	   VR-­‐3	  REIS	   UAV	   1980	   1981-­‐83	   5	   	  	  
4	   An-­‐26/curl	   Transport	  aircraft	   1977	   1979-­‐80	   4	   	  	  
50	   Mi-­‐24D/Mi-­‐25/Hind-­‐D	  
Combat	  
helicopter	   1979	   1980-­‐85	   50	   	  	  1980	  
20	   MiG-­‐25P/Foxbat-­‐A	   fighter	  aircraft	   1979	   1979-­‐80	   20	   incl.	  MiG-­‐25PU	  version	  
6	   Osa/Type-­‐205	   FAC(M)	   1977	   1978-­‐79	   6	   Osa-­‐2	  version	  
1979	  
48	   P-­‐15M/SS-­‐N-­‐2C	  Styx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1977	   1978-­‐79	   48	  
For	  Osa-­‐2	  Class	  
FAC	  
10000	   9M14M/AT-­‐3	  Sagger	   Anti-­‐tank	  missiles	   1968	   1969-­‐78	   10000	  
Incl.	  for	  BRDM-­‐2	  
Saffer	  tank	  
destroyer	  
400	   ZSU-­‐23-­‐4	  Shilka	   SPAAG	   1972	   1972-­‐78	   400	   	  	  
2300	   BMP-­‐1	   IFV	   1977	   1977-­‐89	   2300	   	  	  
650	   R-­‐13S/AA-­‐2S	  Atoll	   SRAAM	   1977	   1977-­‐81	   650	  
for	  MiG-­‐23BN,	  Su-­‐
20	  and	  MiG-­‐21MF	  
combat	  aircraft	  
1978	  
6	   Luna-­‐M/FROG-­‐7	   SSM	  launcher	   1978	   1978	   6	   	  	  
1977	   30	   MiG-­‐21MF/Fishbed-­‐J	   fighter	  aircraft	   1975	   1977	   30	   	  	  
1976	   NO	  NEW	  SHIPMENTS	  OF	  MISSILES	  OR	  AIRCRAFT	  OR	  NAVAL	  TECHNOLOGY	  
1000	   BRDM-­‐2	   Reconnaissance	  AV	   1968	   1969-­‐75	   1000	   	  	  
400	   BTR-­‐50	   APC	   1973	   1973-­‐75	   400	   	  	  
500	   BTR-­‐60PB	   APC	   1973	   1973-­‐75	   500	   	  	  
225	   R-­‐23R/T/AA-­‐7	  Apex	   BVRAAM	   1973	   1974-­‐75	   225	   for	  MiG-­‐23MF	  combat	  aircraft	  
12	   Top	  Bow	   Fire	  control	  radar	   1973	   1974-­‐75	   12	  
For	  use	  with	  50SM-­‐
4-­‐1	  130mm	  guns	  
4	   9K31/SA-­‐9	  Gaskin	   Mobil	  SAM	  system	   1974	   1975	   4	   	  	  
52	   MiG-­‐23MS/Flogger-­‐E	   fighter	  aircraft	   1974	   1974-­‐75	   52	   	  	  
2	   Petya-­‐2	   Corvette	   1974	   1975	   2	   Petya-­‐3	  version	  
312	   R-­‐12R/AA-­‐2C	  Atoll-­‐C	   SRAAM	   1974	   1974-­‐75	   208	   for	  MiG-­‐23MF	  combat	  aircraft	  
1975	  
60	   Strela-­‐1/SA-­‐9	  Gaskin	   SAM	   1974	   1975	   60	   	  	  
1100	   5V27/SA-­‐3B	  Goa	   SAM	   1972	   1972-­‐74	   1100	   	  	  
30	   S-­‐125M/SA-­‐3B	   SAM	  system	   1972	   1972-­‐74	   30	   	  	  
30	   Su-­‐20/Fitter-­‐C/F	   FGA	  aircraft	   1972	   1973-­‐74	   30	   	  	  
200	   3M11/AT-­‐2a	  Swatter	   Anti-­‐tank	  missiles	   1973	   1973-­‐74	   200	   	  	  
1974	  
2000	   3M9/SA-­‐6	  Gainful	   SAM	   1973	   1973-­‐74	   2000	  
Incl.	  replacement	  
for	  missiles	  used	  in	  
1973	  October	  War	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18	   9P117/SS-­‐1	  Scud	  TEL	   SSM	  launcher	   1973	   1974	   18	   	  	  
2	   An-­‐24/Coke	   Transport	  aircraft	   1973	   1974	   2	   	  	  
9	   Ka-­‐25/Hormone-­‐A	   ASW	  helicopter	   1973	   1974	   9	   	  	  
86	   MiG-­‐21MF/Fishbed-­‐J	   fighter	  aircraft	   1973	   1973-­‐74	   86	  
delivered	  to	  
replace	  losses	  of	  
1973	  October	  War	  
50	   MiG-­‐21PFM/Fishbed-­‐F	   fighter	  aircraft	   1973	   1974	   50	  
delivered	  to	  
replace	  losses	  of	  
1973	  October	  War	  
1	   P-­‐4	   FAC(T)	   1973	   1974	   1	   	  	  
840	   R-­‐12R/AA-­‐2C	  Atoll-­‐C	   SRAAM	   1973	   1973-­‐74	   840	   for	  MiG-­‐21MF	  combat	  aircraft	  
72	   R-­‐17/SS-­‐1c	  Scud-­‐B	   SSM	   1973	   1973-­‐74	   72	   No.	  delivered	  could	  be	  over	  200	  
3	   Komat/Type-­‐183	   FAC(M)	   1974	   1974	   3	   	  	  
	  
12	   P-­‐15/SS-­‐N-­‐2A	  Styx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1974	   1974	   12	  
For	  Komar	  Class	  
FAC;	  status	  
uncertain	  
250	   ZSU-­‐57-­‐2	   SPAAG	   1966	   1967-­‐73	   250	   	  	  
200	   BM-­‐21	  Grad	  122mm	   MRL	   1972	   1972-­‐73	   200	   	  	  
6	   Luna-­‐M/FROG-­‐7	   SSM	  launcher	   1972	   1973	   6	   	  	  
10	   Mi-­‐6T/Hook-­‐A	   Helicopter	   1972	   1972-­‐73	   10	   	  	  
20	   2K12	  Kvadrat/SA-­‐6A	   SAM	  system	   1973	   1973	   20	   	  	  
6	   Luna-­‐M/FROG-­‐7	   SSM	  launcher	   1973	   1973	   6	   	  	  
15	   Mi-­‐8T/Hip-­‐C	   Helicopter	   1973	   1973	   15	   	  	  
1973	  
25	   Su-­‐7B/Fitter-­‐A	   FGA	  aircraft	   1973	   1973	   25	  
possibly	  incl.	  some	  
Su-­‐7U	  trainer	  
version	  
1200	   R-­‐13S/AA-­‐1	  Atoll	   SRAAM	   1967	   1967-­‐72	   300	   	  	  
200	   BRDM-­‐2	   tank	  detroyer	  (M)	   1968	   1969-­‐72	   200	   	  	  
1000	   BRDM-­‐2	   Reconnaisance	  AV	   1968	   1969-­‐75	   1000	   	  	  
30	   Mi-­‐8T/ip-­‐C	   Helicopter	   1969	   1971-­‐72	   30	   	  	  
10	   MiG-­‐17/Fresco	   fighter	  aircraft	   1969	   1972	   10	   	  	  
25	   MiG-­‐21	  PFM/Fishbed-­‐F	   fighter	  aircraft	   1970	   1972	   25	   	  	  
1972	  
110	   5V27/SA-­‐3B	  Goa	   SAM	   1972	   1972-­‐74	   1100	   	  	  
1971	   135	   MiG-­‐21F/Fishbed-­‐C	   fighter	  aircraft	   1967	   1967-­‐71	   135	   Incl	  some	  25	  MiG-­‐21U	  trainer	  version	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40	   Su-­‐7B/Fitter-­‐A	   FGA	  aircraft	   1967	   1968-­‐71	   40	   Incl.	  some	  Su-­‐7U	  trainer	  version	  
300	   BTR-­‐152	   APC	   1968	   1969-­‐71	   300	   	  	  
100	   BRDM-­‐1	   Reconnaissance	  AV	   1970	   1970-­‐71	   100	   	  	  
150	   BTR-­‐60PB	   APC	   1970	   1970-­‐71	   150	   	  	  
	  
2	   Mi-­‐4A/Hound-­‐A	   Helicopter	   1970	   1971	   2	   	  	  
1970	   12	   Luna/FROG	   SSM	  launcher	   1967	   1969-­‐70	   12	   	  	  
200	   BM-­‐14	  140mm	   MRL	   1967	   1967-­‐69	   200	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  
100	   BM-­‐21	  Grad	  122mm	   MRL	   1967	   1968-­‐69	   100	   	  	  
300	   BM-­‐24	  240mm	   MRL	   1967	   1967-­‐69	   300	   probably	  ex-­‐Soviet	  
40	   S-­‐75	  Dvina/SA-­‐2	   SAM	  system	  	   1967	   1967-­‐69	   40	   	  	  
1969	  
960	   SA-­‐2/Guideline	   SAM	   1967	   1967-­‐69	   960	   for	  SA-­‐2	  SAM	  systems	  
6	   An-­‐12/Cub	   Transport	  aircraft	   1967	   1968	   6	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  1968	  
50	   MiG-­‐17/Fresco	   Fighter	  aircraft	   1967	   1967-­‐68	   50	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  
250	   BTR-­‐152	   APC	   1966	   1967	   250	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  
150	   BTR-­‐50	   APC	   1966	   1966-­‐67	   150	   	  	  1967	  
20	   Mi-­‐4A/Hound-­‐A	   Helicopter	   1967	   1967	   20	   	  	  
6	   Komar/Type-­‐183	   FAC(M)	   1962	   1963-­‐66	   6	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  
500	   9M69/AT-­‐1	  Snapper	   Anti-­‐tank	  missiles	   1965	   1966	   500	   	  	  
8	   Osa/Type-­‐205	   FAC(M)	   1965	   1966	   8	  
Possibly	  ex-­‐Soviet	  
(but	  maximum	  only	  
a	  few	  years	  old);	  
Osa-­‐1	  version	  
1966	  
76	   P-­‐15/SS-­‐N-­‐2A	  Styx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1965	   1966	   76	  
For	  Osa-­‐1	  and	  
Komar	  Class	  FAC	  
1965	   7	   I1-­‐28/Beagle	   bomber	  aircraft	   1964	   1965	   7	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  
1964	   SAME	  AS	  1965	  
1963	   24	   P-­‐15/SS-­‐N-­‐2A	  Styx	   Anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1962	   1963	   24	   For	  Komar	  FAC	  
1962	   SAME	  AS	  1963	  
1961	   16	   P-­‐4	   FAC(T)	   1956	   1957-­‐61	   16	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  
1960	   80	   SU	  100	   Tank	  destroyer	  (g)	   1958	   1959-­‐60	   80	   Ex-­‐Soviet	  
1959	   SAME	  AS	  1960	  
1958	   10	   Mi-­‐4A/Hound-­‐A	   Helicopter	   1957	   1958	   10	   	  	  
8	   I1-­‐14/Crate	   Transport	  aircraft	   1956	   1957	   8	   	  	  
7	   Mi-­‐1/Hare	   Light	  helicopter	   1956	   1957	   7	   	  	  
60	   MiG-­‐17/Fresco	   fighter	  aircraft	   1956	   1957	   60	   	  	  
1957	  
20	   Yak-­‐18A/Max	   Trainer	  aircraft	   1957	   1957	   20	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1954	   NO	  ARMS	  SHIPMENTS	  
1953	   NO	  ARMS	  SHIPMENTS	  
1952	   NO	  ARMS	  SHIPMENTS	  
1951	   NO	  ARMS	  SHIPMENTS	  




























Appendix	  C:	  Transfers	  of	  aircraft,	  naval	  technology,	  and	  missiles	  from	  
USSR/Russia	  to	  Egypt	  from	  1970-­‐2009	  
	  










produced	   Comments	  
2009	  
600	   Igla/SA-­‐18	  Grouse	   Portable	  SAM	   2007	   2009	   100	  
For	  modernization	  
of	  ZSU-­‐23	  SPAAG	  
to	  ZSU-­‐23-­‐4M4	  
2008	   SAME	  AS	  2009	  
2007	   SAME	  AS	  2009	  
20	   S-­‐125	  Pechora-­‐2	   SAM	  system	   2006	   2006	   20	  
Egyptian	  S-­‐125	  
(SA-­‐3)	  SAMs	  
rebuilt	  to	  Pechora	  
M2	  version	  2006	  
20	   S-­‐125	  Pechora-­‐2M	   SAM	  system	   1999	   2002-­‐06	   10	  
Egyptian	  S-­‐125	  
(SA-­‐3)	  SAMs	  
rebuilt	  to	  Pechora	  
M2	  version	  
2005	   SAME	  AS	  2006	  
2004	   SAME	  AS	  2006	  
2003	   SAME	  AS	  2006	  
2002	   SAME	  AS	  2006	  
2001	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
2000	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1999	   27	   Mi-­‐8/Mi-­‐17/Hip-­‐H	   Helicopter	   1997	   1997-­‐99	   27	   	  	  
1998	   SAME	  AS	  1999	  
1997	   SAME	  AS	  1999	  
1996	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1995	   580	   9M113/AT-­‐5	  Spandrel	  
Anti-­‐tank	  
missiles	   1991	   1992-­‐95	   580	   	  	  
1994	   1	   P-­‐12/Spoon	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1992	   1994	   1	   	  	  
1993	   SAME	  AS	  1995	  
1992	   SAME	  AS	  1995	  
1991	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1990	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1989	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1988	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1987	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1986	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1985	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1984	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1983	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1982	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	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1981	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1980	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1979	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1978	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1977	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1976	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1975	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
120	   R-­‐13R/AA-­‐2C	  Atoll-­‐C	   SRAAM	   1973	   1974	   120	  
for	  MiG-­‐23BN	  
combat	  aircraft	  
20	   MiG	  23BN/Flogger-­‐H	   FGA	  aircraft	   1973	   1974	   20	   incl.	  4	  MiG-­‐23U	  
250	   BMP-­‐1	   IFV	   1971	   1973-­‐74	   	  	   	  	  
1974	  
10000	   Strela-­‐2/SA-­‐7	  Grail	   Portable	  SAM	   1968	   1969-­‐74	   10000	  
Incl.	  some	  SA-­‐N-­‐5	  
naval	  version	  
1	   PRV-­‐9/Thin	  Skin	   Height-­‐finding	  radar	   1973	   1973	   1	  
for	  1	  regiment	  of	  6	  
SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
1	   P-­‐12	  Spoon	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1973	   1973	   1	   for	  1	  regiment	  of	  6	  SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
30	   MiG-­‐19	  Farmer	   fighter	  aircraft	   1973	   1973	   20	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
6	   Long	  Track	   Air	  search	  radar	   1973	   1973	   6	   for	  6	  SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
250	   3M9/SA-­‐9	  Gainful	   SAM	   1973	   1973	   250	   	  	  
6	   2K12	  Kvadrat/SA-­‐6A	   SAM	  system	   1973	   1973	   6	   	  	  




36	   R-­‐17/SS-­‐1c	  Scud-­‐B	   SSM	   1970	   1971-­‐73	   36	   	  	  
650	   BTR-­‐60BP	  APC	   APC	   1969	   1970-­‐73	   650	   	  	  
9	   9P117/SS-­‐1	  Scud	  TEL	   SSM	  launcher	   1970	  
1971-­‐
1973	   9	   	  	  
200	   ZSU-­‐23-­‐4	  Shilka	   SPAAG	   1967	   1967-­‐73	   200	   	  	  
1973	  
3000	   9M14M/AT-­‐3	  Sagger	  
Anti-­‐tank	  
missiles	   1966	  
1967-­‐
1973	   3000	   	  	  
1	   PRV-­‐9/Thin	  Skin	   Height-­‐finding	  radar	   1972	   1972	   1	  
for	  1	  regiment	  of	  6	  
SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
1	   P-­‐12	  Spoon	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1972	   1972	   1	   for	  1	  regiment	  of	  6	  SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
6	   Long	  Track	   Air	  search	  radar	   1972	   1972	   6	   for	  6	  SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
1972	  
250	   3M9/SA-­‐9	  Gainful	   SAM	   1972	   1972	   250	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6	   2K12	  Kvadrat/SA-­‐6A	   SAM	  system	   1972	   1972	   6	   	  	  
4	   SO-­‐1	   Patrol	  craft	   1971	   1971-­‐72	   4	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
1	   PRV-­‐9/Thin	  Skin	   Height-­‐finding	  radar	   1971	   1972	   1	  
for	  1	  regiment	  of	  6	  
SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
1	   P-­‐12/Spoon	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1971	   1972	   1	   for	  1	  regiment	  of	  6	  SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
6	   Long	  Track	   Air	  search	  radar	   1971	   1972	   6	   for	  6	  SA-­‐6	  SAM	  systems	  
250	   3M9/SA-­‐9	  Gainful	   SAM	   1971	   1972	   250	   	  	  
6	   2K12	  Kvadrat/SA-­‐6A	   SAM	  system	   1971	   1972	   6	   	  	  





20	   Su-­‐20/Fitter-­‐C/F	   FGA	  aircraft	   1970	   1972	   20	   	  	  
45	   S-­‐125M/SA-­‐3B	   SAM	  system	   1970	   1971-­‐72	   45	   	  	  
10	   PRV-­‐11/Side	  Net	   Height-­‐finding	  radar	   1970	   1971-­‐72	   10	   	  	  
10	   P-­‐15/Flat	  Face-­‐A	   Air	  search	  radar	   1970	   1971-­‐72	   10	   	  	  
10	   P-­‐12/Spoon	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1970	   1971-­‐72	   10	   for	  use	  with	  SA-­‐3	  SAM	  systems	  
100	   MiG-­‐17/Fresco	   Fighter	  aircraft	   1970	   1971	   35	  
ex-­‐Soviet;	  number	  
could	  be	  as	  high	  as	  
165	  
50	   AS-­‐5	  KELT	   anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1970	   1970-­‐72	   50	   for	  Tu-­‐16	  combat	  aircraft	  
1600	   5V-­‐27/SA-­‐3B	  Goa	   SAM	   1970	   1971-­‐72	   1600	   	  	  
750	   SA-­‐2	  Guidline	   SAM	   1968	   1970-­‐72	   750	   for	  SA-­‐2SAM	  systems	  
20	   S-­‐75	  Dvina/SA-­‐2	   SAM	  system	   1968	   1969-­‐70	   20	   	  	  
12	   Luna-­‐M/FROG-­‐7	   SSM	  launcher	   1968	   1971-­‐72	   12	   	  	  
140	   Su-­‐7B/Fitter-­‐A	   FGA	  aircraft	   1967	   1967-­‐72	   140	   	  	  
	  
2640	   R-­‐13S/AA-­‐2	  Atoll	  	   SRAAM	   1967	   1967-­‐72	   2640	  
for	  MiG-­‐21MF,	  Su-­‐




100	   BM-­‐21	  Grand	  122mm	   MRL	   1967	   1968-­‐72	   100	   	  	  
80	   Mi-­‐8T/Hip-­‐C	   Helicopter	   1969	   1970-­‐71	   80	   	  	  
1971	  
11	   Mi-­‐6T/Hook-­‐A	   Helicopter	   1969	   1971	   11	   	  	  
20	   PRA-­‐11/Side	  Net	   height-­‐finding	  radar	   1968	   1969-­‐70	   20	   	  	  
20	   P-­‐15/Flat	  Face-­‐A	   Air	  search	  radar	   1968	   1969-­‐70	   20	   	  	  
20	   P-­‐12/Spoon	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1968	   1969-­‐70	   20	   for	  use	  with	  SA-­‐2	  SAM	  systems	  
100	   BRDM-­‐2	   Reconnaissance	  AV	   1968	   1969-­‐70	   100	   	  	  
1970	  
16	   P-­‐6	   FAC(T)	   1965	   1966-­‐70	   16	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
10	   P-­‐14/Tall	  King	   Air	  search	  radar	   1967	   1969	   10	   	  	  
200	   BRDM-­‐1	   Reconnaissance	  AV	   1967	   1968-­‐69	   200	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
1969	  
6	   Romeo/Type-­‐633	   Submarine	   1966	   1966-­‐69	   6	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
100	   MiG21F/Fishbed-­‐C	   fighter	  aircraft	   1967	   1967-­‐68	   100	   	  	  
11	   An-­‐12/Cub	   transport	  aircraft	   1967	   1967-­‐68	   11	   	  	  
7	   Shershen	   FAC(T)	   1966	   1967-­‐68	   7	   	  	  
104	   P-­‐15/SS-­‐N-­‐2A	  Styx	   anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1966	   1966-­‐68	   104	   for	  Osa-­‐1	  Class	  FAC	  
1968	  
500	   3M11/AT-­‐2a	  Swatter	  
Anti-­‐tank	  
missiles	   1965	   1966-­‐68	   500	   	  	  
2	   Skory	   Destroyer	   1967	   1967	   2	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
50	   MiG-­‐19	  Farmer	   fighter	  aircraft	   1967	   1967	   50	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
60	   Su-­‐7B/Fitter-­‐A	   FGA	  aircraft	   1965	   1967	   60	   	  	  
18	   PRV-­‐11/Side	  Net	   Height-­‐finding	  radar	   1965	   1966-­‐67	   18	   	  	  
18	   P-­‐15/Flat	  Face-­‐A	   Air	  search	  radar	   1965	   1966-­‐67	   18	   for	  use	  with	  SA-­‐2	  SAM	  systems	  
18	   P-­‐12/Spoon	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1965	   1966-­‐67	   18	   for	  use	  with	  SA-­‐2	  SAM	  systems	  
12	   Luna/FROG	   SSM	  launcher	   1965	   1967	   12	   	  	  
18	   S-­‐75	  Dvina/SA-­‐2	   SAM	  system	   1962	   1963-­‐67	   18	   	  	  
1967	  
1338	   R-­‐13S/AA-­‐2	  Atoll	  	   SRAAM	   1962	   1962-­‐67	   1338	  




163	   MiG-­‐21F/Fishbed-­‐C	   Fighter	  aircraft	   1962	   1962-­‐67	   163	  
Acquired	  in	  




8	   SO-­‐1	   Patrol	  craft	   1961	   1962-­‐67	   8	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
32	   P-­‐15/SS-­‐N-­‐2A	  Styx	   anti-­‐ship	  missiles	   1961	   1962-­‐67	   32	   For	  Komar	  Class	  FAC	  
	  
8	   Komar/Type-­‐183	   FAC(M)	   1961	   1962-­‐67	   8	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
13	   Osa/Type-­‐205	   FAC(M)	   1965	   1966	   12	  
Possibly	  ex-­‐Soviet	  
(but	  maximum	  




600	   BTR-­‐152	   APC	   1961	   1962-­‐66	   600	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
4	   SMB-­‐1	   Landing	  craft	   1964	   1965	   4	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
8	   Mi-­‐6T/Hook-­‐A	   Helicopter	   1964	   1965	   8	   	  	  
30	   BM-­‐24	  240mm	   MRL	   1963	   1964-­‐65	   30	   Probably	  ex-­‐Soviet	  
432	   SA-­‐2	  Guidline	   SAM	   1962	   1963-­‐65	   432	   	  	  
15	   An-­‐12/Cub	   transport	  aircraft	   1962	   1963-­‐65	   15	   	  	  
1965	  
500	   9M69/AT-­‐1	  Snapper	  
Anti-­‐tank	  
missiles	   1962	   1963-­‐65	   500	   	  	  
4	   SS-­‐C-­‐2	  CDS	   Coast	  Defense	  System	   1963	   1963-­‐64	   4	   	  	  
30	   BM-­‐14	  140mm	   MRL	   1962	   1963-­‐64	   30	   ex-­‐Soviet	  





63	   Top	  Bow	   Fire	  control	  radar	   1960	   1961-­‐64	   63	   For	  use	  with	  SM-­‐4-­‐1	  130mm	  guns	  
50	   SON-­‐9/Fire	  Can	   Fire	  control	  radar	   1960	   1960-­‐63	   50	   For	  use	  with	  S-­‐60	  57mm	  AA	  guns	  
1963	  
50	   SON-­‐9/Fire	  Can	   Fire	  control	  radar	   1960	   1960-­‐63	   50	  
For	  use	  with	  300	  
KS-­‐19	  100mm	  AA	  
guns	  
1	   Whiskey/	  Type-­‐613	   Submarine	   1962	   1962	   1	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
2	   Skory	   Destroyer	   1962	   1962	   2	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
1962	  
100	   ZSU-­‐57-­‐2	   SPAAG	   1960	   1961-­‐62	   100	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25	   Tu-­‐16/Badger	   Bomber	  aircraft	   1960	   1961-­‐62	   25	  
ex-­‐Soviet;	  no.	  
delivered	  could	  be	  
up	  to	  30	  
1961	   40	   Mi-­‐4A/Hound-­‐A	   Helicopter	   1956	   1956-­‐61	   40	   	  	  
40	   BM-­‐13	  132mm	   MRL	   1959	   1960	   40	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
1960	  
18	   P-­‐6	   FAC(T)	   1955	   1956-­‐60	   18	   	  	  
1959	   80	   MiG-­‐19	  Farmer	   fighter	  aircraft	   1958	   1958-­‐59	   80	   	  	  
7	   Whiskey/	  Type-­‐613	   Submarine	   1957	   1957-­‐58	   7	   ex-­‐Soviet	  





10	   I1-­‐14/Crate	   transport	  aircraft	   1957	   1958	   10	   	  	  
40	   Yak-­‐18A/Max	   trainer	  aircraft	   1956	   1956-­‐57	   40	   	  	  
1	   MV	   Submarine	   1956	   1957	   1	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
10	   Mi-­‐1/Hare	   Light	  helicopter	   1956	   1956-­‐57	   10	  
SM-­‐1	  version	  from	  
Polish	  production	  
line	  





100	   MiG-­‐17/Fresco	   fighter	  aircraft	   1955	   1956-­‐57	   100	   From	  Polish	  production	  line	  
35	   Yak-­‐11/Moose	   trainer	  aircraft	   1955	   1956	   35	  




70	   SON-­‐9/Fire	  Can	   Fire	  control	  radar	   1955	   1955-­‐56	   70	  
For	  use	  with	  KS-­‐
18	  85mm	  AA	  
guns;	  status	  
uncertain	  
2	   Skory	   Destroyer	   1955	   1956	   2	   ex-­‐Soviet	  
2	   P-­‐20	  Token	   Air	  search	  radar	   1955	   1956	   2	   	  	  
2	   P-­‐10/Knife	  Rest	   Air	  search	  radar	   1955	   1956	   2	   	  	  
2	   MiG-­‐15/Fagot	   fighter	  aircraft	   1955	   1956	   2	   ex-­‐Soviet	  











20	   I1-­‐14/Crate	   trainer	  aircraft	   1955	   1955-­‐56	   20	   	  	  
	  




1955	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1954	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1953	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1952	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	  
1951	   NO	  REPORTED	  SALES	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